Weekend 3: Handwritten notes

Theorising data

The quality of theorising data is key in doctoral research. See Dean’s two papers to explore what it means to theorise something, for example application of Foucault’s ideas to policies surrounding safeguarding in sports coaching.

Rorty stats that “All we have is interpretation”, so all we have is differing interpretations of experiences. Should we strive towards truth, in its absence.

Jean-Luc Nancy explored the concept of “being with”: we cannot exist as individuals, as we are social beings. Our identity emerges through our interaction with others. Identity captures our engaging with others within particular contexts.

Judith Butler discussed performativity – we perform differently in different contexts. There is no ‘essence’ of ourselves.

We bring meaning to data – it is a process of construction of meaning. The data does not exist without the meaning and the significance we put on it. Context is of key significance, and helps us to produce meaning. There is construction of the context between interviewer and interviewee.
This links to reflexivity – the narrative of who we are, our aspects of self and our connections to the research.

There was a brief discussion over research data anomalies – it is of great interest to explore anomalous data rather than to try and ignore it. Why is it there? What does it mean in relation to the agreeing data?

 Key issues arising from the evening activity

Truth is plural – there are multiple truths.
Who we are and how we see influences our perception of truth. Our interpretations cause us to see the world differently. We privilege some things and deselect others – perception is very individual.
We need to relate this to our ontological and epistemological position.
Ontology is existence.

If truth is a plural concept, the ontological status is relativism. Interpretation is critical. We are not dealing with the ontological realism of a singularity of truth but a plurality of multiple truths.

BUT – does this mean ‘anything goes’? – The tutor asked us to question whether this was actually important. We always have to live with uncertainty, so why not with uncertainty over research. However, there are certain truths which hold sway at different times – these are not foundational but are based on community debate as to what is temporarily/provisionally held to count as ‘truth’. However, within this community, there may be different perspectives, with tensions between them. Therefore, there is no total agreement on interpretation/truth.

Other key issues:

Meaning does not reside in the data itself – meaning is brought into being and partly constructed through our interaction with it. The sense we make of data is affected by what we bring (culturally, socially, historically located) i.e. CONTEXT.

Discovery as a metaphor for research is inaccurate. It is more a construction and creation than a discovery. For example phenomenological hermeneutics acknowledge the importance of ‘self’ in the construction and telling of the ‘other’ – self and other are conjoined.
We cannot bracket off our subjectivity but we must embrace it – this is who I am and this affects how I understand and interpret.

Heidegger suggests that we are already located in presuppositions – ie our ‘being in the world’ – our social, historical, cultural context.

Nancy: ‘being with’ locates you – who you are with affects who you are.

Michael Polanyi discussed ‘tacit knowledge’: knowledge we cannot explicitly explain but that we have. We cannot render a feeling fully explicit (e.g. my choice of IPA?)

Other issues raised:

The criteria with which our research is judged: where I position myself in relation to onto-epistemic issues. I  need to articulate how I want to be judged – I will need to discuss the criteria for judgement.

Conventional criteria do not apply in qualitative contexts. Remodelling of the criteria to include, for example, authenticity and verisimilitude are still ‘fudging’ the issue – still appealing to accuracy but by different names. We only have the power of rhetoric to take the reader into your word – you need resonance with the reader, and this will not always happen.

What you write will only ever ring true for some people. Validity shifts from accuracy to a plain that recognises the importance of resonance and experience – connection to the information. This is not a simplistic correspondence, such as ‘does the report accurately represent reality?’

This shifts the test of validity – the truth of the account partly resides in the standpoint of the reader. Truth isn’t solely controlled by the authorial account.

Dean is going to send out a paper on the flexibility of validity.

Presentation (PowerPoint) on Heidegerrian Phenomenology

Slide 1:

Ò  … utilises a hermeneutic approach that is fundamentally ontological

Ò  This informs us of ‘how’ a ‘what’ is to be treated, and is primarily methodological

Ò  ‘what does this data mean’ becomes ‘how is this data meaningful’?

The activity we took part in was fundamentally ontological – we drew on our own being. The questions move from ‘what does this mean’ to ‘how is this meaningful?’ – our interaction and construction bring meaning into being.

 Slide 2:

Ò  The latter cannot be answered except in relation to Dasein (da – here; sein – being)

Ò  Thus, descriptions are impossible without interpretation

Ò  ‘the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation’ (Heidegger 1962: 61).

Descriptions are impossible without interpretation and construction of meaning. Our identities (plural rather than singular) are exposed differently depending on our ‘being with’. Identities are contextually located.

Slide 3:

Ò  Being and becoming are hermeneutic:

Ò   ‘the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial significance of the word, where it designates this business of interpreting’ (Heidegger 1962: 62).

Becoming: Being isn’t fixed – it is dynamic. We ‘become’ according to those around us – it is relational.

Slide 4:

Ò  Interpretation is ‘grounded in something we have in advance fore-having … we see in advance fore-sight … and something we grasp in advance fore-conception (Heidegger 1962: 193)

Ò  The implication for research is that data is analysed through these fore-structures

Ò  Such structures suggest that understanding is not ground in data but in what people have in advance – the always already Being

‘Fore-having’ – we have ‘fore-conception’ – we analyse data through these fore-structures. The understanding is not grounded in data but in being and fore-having – i.e. we have preconceptions and ‘baggage’.

Therefore, research is always already theoretically over-determined – we are always already theoretical as we are always already schooled in some sense, e.g. through family, community, culture, tradition. We cannot bracket that.

 Slide 5:

Ò  Key points

Ò  The object and subject of the world are inseparable

Ò   Dasein is the Being that is peculiar to humans who must paradoxically live in relationships while simultaneously being ultimately alone with oneself

Ò  To understand the Other, a person’s behaviour or expressions, one has to study that person in context

It is impossible to know when what is outside of ourselves starts and what is internal begins in regard to interpretation. Interpretation is an interaction but we cannot pin it down. We cannot recognise the extent of our self. Ethically, this is very powerful as we as the author have to consider equity, responsibility, whose voices we choose to privilege and whose we silence.

Reflexivity involves engaging critically with what we recognise as our position and subjectivity, to interrogate but we will always fail as we cannot fully recognise the extent of our influence.

Reflexivity: positioning our professional values that are shared with the contextualisation of the work.

Grounded Theory

Slide 1:

… addresses the ‘important enterprise of how the discovery of theory from data - systematically obtained and analyzed in social research - can be furthered’

Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative research, London:  Aldine, p.1).

Glaser & Strauss (1967): The discovery of theory from data

Theories from the study are based on data – theories emerged from the data, i.e. the authors weren’t bringing anything to it – the data drove the themes. This assumes that we enter the context of research without baggage, in order to see what’s occurring. It assumes that no literature has been read beforehand, there are no lenses to see through, allowing data to drive theory production – data “springs forth”. BUT there is no acknowledgement of a lens.

 

Slide 2:

—  … relies upon ‘a general method of comparative analysis’ (p.1)

‘we would all agree that in social research generating theory goes hand in hand with verifying it’ (p.2).

This is problematic as it suggests that there is logical induction. Karl Popper critiques logical induction through the black swan story. There is no way of verifying a theory based on induction. There is always the possibility of an anomaly in the next observation. We can only ever falsify a theory rather than verify it.

How can we ever know how close we are to ‘the truth’? Verify against what? We cannot know how near or far we are from a ‘truth’.

The categories we develop in our minds are influenced by our framing of the context. We cannot verify it – if something (a theme) keeps repeating itself, it is because we keep seeing it. We may not see other things.

There is a tension in grounded theory – it wants us to be open-minded, inductive and generative BUT it is also seeking to verify – that is, it is narrowing, reductive and deductive.

What are the external references allowing us to verify something, other than keeping seeing the same thing? – affirmation of the self.

 

Slide 3:

—  According to Glaser and Strauss – grounded theory appeals to the ‘interrelated jobs of theory in sociology:

                (1) to enable prediction and explanation of         behaviour; (2) to be useful in theoretical advance in                 sociology; (3) to be usable in practical applications –        prediction and explanation should be able to give                 the practitioner understanding and some control of        situation; (4) to provide a perspective on behaviour                 – a stance to be taken towards data; and (5) to guide and provide a style for research on particular         areas of behaviour’ (p.3).

“Prediction and explanation” come up several times in these assumptions – these align with the key concepts of positivism. This holds to the view that there is a ‘real view’ of the world – theory is developed on that basis and we can remove our subjectivity, so in reality, GT is positivist.

Slide 5:

—  Located where? … possibly conceptual tensions?

—  Used in education research, nursing and organisational studies, but also elsewhere

—  Has much in common with ethnography, case study, action research

—  Rejection of a priori theorising – emergent theory

—  Implicit verification-ism

—  Not steeped in literature

—  Inductive, constructivist approach to data collection

—  Imperative to reach saturation, but why?

—  Interaction between data collection, analysis and theory building – ‘theory must “fit” the situation being researched’ (p.3)

Features of grounded theory: It is unsure where it sits – there are conceptual tensions. It rejects a priori theorising.

Slide 6:

—  ‘Categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under study; by “work” we mean that they must be meaningfully relevant to and be able to explain the behaviour under study

—  … categories are discovered by examination of the data’ (p. 3).

—  ‘the adequacy of a theory for sociology today cannot be divorced from the process by which it is generated’ (p.5).

To generate theory…

GT suggests that the meaning/theme is already there, and is not imposed by the self. But how can this be separate? We interact (with our baggage) – they suggest that this doesn’t happen and that the categories are there *before* our interaction.

Slide 8:

—  ‘The biographies of scientists are replete with stories of occasional flashes of insight, of seminal ideas, garnered from sources outside the data. But the generation of theory from such insights must then be brought into relation to the data, or there is great danger that theory and the empirical world will mismatch’ (p.6)

What is the ‘empirical world’ – we only know the phenomenal one through our own senses and constructions.

NOTE: The tutor did mention the work of CHarmaz with regard to grounded theory, but suggested that her developments took it away from grounded theory and it was closer to phenomenology.

What makes good quality qualitative research for me?

The first readings I had to complete for my first EdD weekend all revolved around the concept of the validity of research. How do we measure (if indeed we can?) what “good” qualitative research is? There were a range of viewpoints, depending on the philosophical and methodological viewpoints of the authors. I could see that each made sense in its own context. However, I didn’t really have any background understanding to critique the ideas adequately, and nor did I then know which way my own research would take me.

Since then, I’ve made the decision to use IPA, and feel comfortable with the relationship between this and my own views on truth and knowledge. I’ve been thinking back as to how I can ensure the quality of the research I am about to undertake. In my quantitative research past, I’ve been concerned over methods, statistics, reproducibility etc. But now, as they say, for something completely different.

Smith and the other IPA stalwarts discuss quality, but in my limited timescale and support for this small scale research, use of other people to determine whether my interpretations are appropriate is not possible. I’ve seen several papers mention Yardley (2000) in relation to quality, so I’ve had a look at her paper. Her thoughts are interesting and relevant, and above all, achievable in my timescale.

Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in qualitative health research. Psychology and Health, 15(2), 215-228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08870440008400302

The suggested reason for the increase in the use of qualitative methodologies (QMs) in health psychology is that it provides a detailed exploration of the experiences of the participant. Yardley clearly identifies that these are true methodologies, with differing underlying assumptions, rather than just a proliferation of methods of data collection and analysis.

The author highlights the reason for the paper as to how to evaluate qualitative research. She suggests that there is a gap in the understanding of how to evaluate qualitative studies in accredited health psychology. Yardley identifies that qualitative research is defined as ‘not quantitative’, rather than the diverse range of qualitative methodologies having a unified definition. Even within a single tradition, such as phenomenology, there is diversity in its assumptions and approaches.

Yardley suggests that it is the very subjectivity allowed by qualitative work that leads to it being used so extensively. However, because meaning is constructed and negotiate between researcher and participant, the imposition of set criteria for truth would restrict the construction of knowledge and could prejudice particular groups who subscribe to alternative criteria for truth. Therefore, a standardised procedure for performing qualitative methodologies cannot be entertained.

There is a concern in the field of health psychology that QMs most closely resembling quantitative methodologies are gaining precedence over other methods because of familiarity in terms of quality and measurements/assessments of validity. Another concern is a tendency to be drawn towards those methodologies providing a framework within which to complete research, leading to isolated methodologies without the flexibility to understand the benefits of other approaches.

This is something which does niggle away at me. I’m not really fully sure why I chose IPA as a methodology. It seemed ‘right’ for the question I wanted to answer. However, I do wonder whether I am drawn to it because, compared to other methodologies, it seems to provide a ‘process’ through which to work. The guidelines are broad and inclusive, but nevertheless, perhaps I am clinging to the set procedures of quantitative research. Perhaps in later work I should explore some in more detail other areas of phenomenology such as van Manen.

Yardley discusses the issue of quality control, suggesting that we cannot apply quantitative standards of quality, such as representative sampling, reliability and replicability, to QMs. These would be unlikely to be achievable and may also not be desirable. She believes that structured coding and interpretation fashioned by rules means that there is a loss of nuance in the rich data provided by QMs. Nevertheless, a means of ascertaining the quality of qualitative research is needed, so that the work can be judged accordingly.

The author identifies what she believes are four characteristics of good quality research, along with some examples of how these can be achieved. The four characteristics are:

1.       Sensitivity to context;

2.       Commitment and rigour;

3.       Transparency and coherence;

4.       Impact and importance.

Yardley suggests these characteristics but stresses that they are not meant to be applied rigidly. Indeed in order to be useable in a range of QMs they must be flexible.

Sensitivity to context:

The author acknowledges the vital aspect of context within qualitative research. However, whilst it is important to have an understanding of related theories and relevant literature, this knowledge must not cloud the researcher’s interpretation of the data. Areas of divergence from theory must be sufficiently explored, as well as those data which do link the specific study to more abstract theories and generalisations discussed in previous research.

The social and cultural context of participants and researchers must also be considered. Contextualisation of findings can shed new light on meanings. The social context of the data gathering needs to be considered including the shared understandings and conversations between researcher and participant and consideration of the researcher’s position in relation to the participant is vital.

A concern for the perceived power imbalance between researcher and participant is required. Whilst some QMs seek the viewpoint of the participants on the researcher’s interpretations to determine the ‘truth’ of the interpretation (perhaps an example of this is the Patricia Hill Collins reading from week 1), it must be remembered that the opinions of the participant should not over-ride the academic independence of the researcher.

Commitment:

Commitment is suggested through the longer-term involvement of the researcher with the topic being researched, as well as an appropriate ability in the methodology of research and immersion within the data.

Rigour:

This is, Yardley suggests, indicated by the completeness of the data analysis and a sufficient amount of data collection. This will vary depending on the chosen methodology – grounded theory will require more participants than IPA. Within phenomenological research, there should be sufficient depth of interpretation, not just surface level analysis.

Transparency and coherence:

This explores the persuasiveness of the research in constructing a reality. Another area to consider to provide coherence is whether the research question and the philosophical underpinnings of the research are appropriate.

Transparency is achieved through thorough documentation of the process of data collection and analysis and provision of rich data, that is, extensive excerpts. Within IPA, it’s my understanding that this is at least in part provided by the tables of themes and annotated transcripts produced as part of the analysis process. Reflexivity is also needed to demonstrate transparency – identifying the experiences and motivations which underlie the research.

Impact and importance:

The impact of the research is a key factor in determining its value. The value may be theoretical but may also have a wider impact within other fields. There may also be a socio-cultural impact to the research. Yardley suggests that an advantage for QMs in health research is their close link to practice. This would, presumably, be similar within educational research.

Yardley concludes by stressing the importance of integrity in QM, whilst taking into account the diversity of these methodologies.

Further reading?

Stern (1997) Strategies for overcoming the rage of rejection. In Morse (ed.), Completing a qualitative project: details and dialogue (pp. 135-145). This covers how to get over editors rejecting work for publication. Its relevance is, perhaps, stressing that you need to clearly demonstrate to the reviewer/reader how you expect your research to be measured against concepts of quality. If you're explicit, there's less room for misunderstanding.

Bringing together the week 1 reading

Even before the weekend, I'd started to get an understanding of why we'd been given the articles to read. They all revolve around the idea of validity. How do we know that research is good research? Do we actually need to know this?

Different paradigms raise different interpretations of what is meant by 'good' research and how this can be determined.

At the weekend session, each group was given a paper to discuss. we ended up with Lather, which was rather mind-blowing.

What was said about each author?

Hammersley: A post-empiricist, believing in 'subtle realism'. He believes that rigorously conducted method is a guarantor of truth, from a scientific viewpoint. "Validity is a synonym of truth and method its guarantor" (p. 69). This is the correspondence theory of truth. For Hammersley, research is science.

Smith: Outlines three perspectives that challenge the dominant view. He suggests that all judgements are based on practical, ethical issues - we are all post-foundationalists. We make judgements based on social interaction. The criteria aren't fixed in advance (compare to Hammersley). Think about how you judge art. You engage with the piece - you ask questions of it, it asks questions of you - a "fusion of horizons" - dialectical criteria.

Collins: Structures in society perpetuate the dominant truth. Concrete experience is required.

Lather: Not quite 'anything goes' but suggests a more open view of what can be used to consider validity. Be aware that even in alternative views of validity, the shadowy hand of positivism remains.
 Use of reflexive poetry, reflecting on participants' feedback. All needs t be considered. And maybe all's been done before...Erasmus Darwin  - scientific prose in poetry! It seems that, although Lather suggested that some of her ideas were undoubtedly ephemeral; nevertheless, some seem to have ensured over 20 years... http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08893675.2015.1051293

Week 1 reading - heaven knows, (almost) anything goes!

Lather, P. (1993). Fertile obsession: Validity after poststructuralism. The Sociological Quarterly, 34(4), 673-693.

This is the final piece we were asked to read before the first EdD weekend. This was, quite possibly, the most difficult work to read. I've read and re-read it and still can barely get my head around the concepts. There may be some interpretations of her work that make it clearer to a beginner in this area - I'll have to have a look. Usual caveats apply with this overview of the article - there's a lot of direct material and little interpretation. I will need to go back to the original article if I want to use anything at a later date :-/

(Note: maybe have a read through this: https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Nf_FBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT64&lpg=PT64&dq=what+is+%22antifoundational+discourse+theory%22&source=bl&ots=TOjElHemfF&sig=JXGS-k2qOQECK6kQwxJTIVqNk9Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CC8Q6AEwA2oVChMI6Mab1v7IyAIVg4UaCh2sFgZn#v=onepage&q=what%20is%20%22antifoundational%20discourse%20theory%22&f=false)

Lather suggests that, at the time of the article, everything is up for discussion, to develop a new way of thinking or rather new ways. She defines validity as "the conditions of the legitimisation of knowledge in contemporary postpositivism" (p. 673).  "Rethinking validity in light of antifoundational discourse theory". She wants to continue to use the word "validity" (with all its associated baggage) but to use it in a more subversive way.

Lather is a poststructuralist feminist and suggests that out of the current void in terms of validity will come innovative ways of imagining it, powered by practice. She muses on the development of validity criteria which are sensitive to context. She suggests that even within the realms of postpositivism, the positivist code still maintains its grip. Think differently is her watchword!

The masks of methodology

Lather suggests we need to see "...what frames out seeing." (p.675). A range of methods have been used to try to resolve the issue of validity, such as member checks, peer review and triangulation, but ultimately these raise more questions than answers. "...to not revert to the dominant, foundational formulaic and readily available codes of validity requires the invention counter discourses/practices of legitimisation" (p. 676).

Transgressive validity

"What do you do with validity once you've met poststructuralism?" Lather provides four "framings" of validity that take antifoundational discourse theory into account.

Counter-practices of authority

Lather introduces a "dispersed validity" (p. 677) suggesting alternative ways of considering validity. She fights against the ideas of "policing sociological sciences" and the development of another "regime of truth". She suggests that her ideas are ephemeral, to open us up to possibilities.

Frame 1: Validity as simulacra/ironic validity
Baudrillard suggests that we have "shifted from a culture of representations to one of simulacra. Neither original nor copy". Ironic validity acknowledges that text will always fail to represent what it points towards but can never reach. Her example (Agee & Evans, 1988) looks at the struggle of an "I" to become an "eye" that both inscribes and interrupt normalising power/knowledge.

Frame 2: Lyotardian paralogy/neopragmatic validity
Legitimising research through 'paralogy' does away with the "Habermasian drive for consensus". Having briefly read about this, my understanding is that Habermas saw discussion as ultimately leading to consensus. However, Lyotard, whilst acknowledging that consensus was one stage of discussion, but ultimately it should lead to 'paralogy' - the development of ideas through conversation which consequently leads to an unending development of new ideas. Lather uses Woodbrooks' (1991) study of African-American women in leadership positions in HE. Woodbrooks used two standard methods of validity in qualitative research - member checks and peer debriefing. After reflecting on the feedback from the participants, she amended her work and sent a second draft to the participants. What resulted was the juxtaposition of the voice of the white female researcher with those of African-American female participants. She held her own frame/lens up for scrutiny and her privilege as a middle-class white female was identified. She had missed out on key aspects of the African-American female experience.

Frame 3: Derridean rigour/rhizomatic validity
Deleuze and Guattari (1983) suggest that the tree is a modernist model of knowledge, but the rhizome as the model for post-modernist knowledge. Arbitrary branching systems of knowledge - networks.

Frame 4: Voluptuous validity/Situated validity
Lather suggests that authority "comes from engagement and self-reflexivity, not distanced 'objectivity'". She discusses Richardson's (1992) essay on a study conducted on unmarried mothers. She writes sociological research as poetry - a "disruptive excess".

Lather suggests that her offerings are given as "more problem than solution" (p. 683). Within the gap offered from the death of positivism lies potential.

My thoughts

I suppose, from a gardening viewpoint, if you pull up a well-established plant which is no longer of use or performing as it should, it opens up clear ground. On the clear ground, seeds can germinate and grow. Not all will reach maturity but in the mean time they are valid competitors which have the potential to grow to maturity.

I can't imagine using these methods of validating research at the moment, but maybe this is because they are so distant from my comfort zone. Of greatest interest out of the four is that of Lyotardian paralogy. It makes sense that conversation should not need to stop at consensus but continue, to see where it does lead.

Actions based on this reading:

• Maybe read about Lyotard some more

 

Weekend 1 reading: Patricia Hill Collins - afrocentric feminist epistemology

Collins, P. H. (1991). Towards an afrocentric feminist epistemology. In: P. H. Collins (ed.). Black feminist thought. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Black feminist thought, like all specialised thought, reflects the interests and standpoints of its creators. Tracing the origin and diffusion of any body of specialised thought reveals its affinity to the power of the group that created it. Because elite white men and their representatives control structures of knowledge validation, white male interests pervade the thematic content of traditional scholarship. As a result, black females' experiences with work, family, motherhood, political activism and sexual politics have been routinely distorted in or excluded from traditional academic discourse.

"Black feminist thought as specialised thought reflects the thematic content of African-American women's experiences. Subordinate groups have to use alternative ways to create independent self-definitions and self-valuations. African-American women have developed a distinctive Black female's standpoint and have done so by using alternative ways of producing and validating knowledge.

"Epistemology: the study of the philosophical problems in concepts of knowledge and truth."
To investigate this work, Collins consulted established bodies of academic research but also her own experiences and those of other Af-Am females - this is illustrated by the use of the word 2our" rather than "their" within the research. Few statistics are reported; instead. the voices of Black women are used. This allows Collins to explore the thematic content of Black feminist work in a way that doesn't violate its basic epistemological framework.

Black women intellectuals often encounter two distinct epistemologies - elite white male interests, and Afrocentric feminist concerns.

Eurocentric masculinist knowledge validation process

The Eurocentric masculinist knowledge validation process: the institutions, paradigms and other elements of the knowledge validation process controlled by elite white men.
Two political criteria influence the knowledge validation process:

1. Knowledge claims are evaluated by a community of experts whose members represent the standpoints of the groups from which they originate;
2. Each community of experts must maintain its credibility as defined by the larger group in which it is situated and from which it draws its taken-for-granted knowledge.

Therefore scholars challenging the basic beliefs of the culture at large are deemed less credible than those supporting popular perspectives. This has suppressed Black feminist thought. Accepting a few "safe" outsiders legitimises keeping outsiders out. Those who challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions run the risk of being ostracised.

Af-Am female academics face potential rejection of knowledge claims on epistemological grounds (theories of knowledge). Rather than using Eurocentric, masculinist criteria for assessing knowledge, they may use other criteria. These methods of validating knowledge claims must be acceptable to the group controlling the knowledge validation process.

For example, positivist approaches of validating knowledge do so by producing objective generalisations, distanced from values, interests and emotions of the researcher. Positivist methodological approaches:

1. Distance the researcher from the 'object' of study;
2. Show an absence of emotions;
3. Ethics and values are deemed inappropriate;
4. Adversarial debates are the preferred method of ascertaining truth.

For these reasons, it's unlikely that Black women would use a positivist epistemological stance in rearticulating a Black female standpoint. Back females are more likely to choose an alternative epistemology, using different standards consistent with Black females' criteria for substantiated knowledge.

So, what does this look like? The core African value system that existed prior to racial oppression, and also a sharing of the common experience of oppression leads to a distinctive Afrocentric epistemology. This is similar to the feminist advance of a history of gender oppression which led to the feminist epistemology. There is an alternative epistemology for Back women - an Afrocentric feminist viewpoint. There is a discussion of the overlap between the feminist and Afrocentric standpoints - with Black women belong to 2both/and" - there is some overlap but also some separate, in addition. The Afrocentric feminist epistemology is rooted in the everyday experiences of AfAm women.

What are the dimensions of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology?

1. Concrete experience as a criterion of meaning

AfAs use wisdom to assess knowledge, and an understanding of their oppression through race, gender and probably class. "Knowledge without wisdom is adequate for the powerful but wisdom is essential to the survival of the subordinate". Those individuals who have lived through the experience about which they claim to be experts are more believable and credible than those who have merely read or thought about such experiences; i.e. the 'lived experience'.

Some scholars claim that women, too, as a group are more likely than men to use concrete knowledge in assessing knowledge claims. Therefore, in valuing the concrete, AfAMFems invoke not only an Afrocentric tradition but a woman's tradition as well. There is considerable institutional support in traditional AfAm communities for valuing concrete experience - sharing it through the 2sisterhood".

2. The use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims

"Dialogue is a talk between two subjects, not speech of subject and object - it is a humanising speech, one that challenges and resists domination."
Through dialogue, connectedness rather than separation is an essential component of the knowledge validation process. The use of dialogue has Afrocentric roots, seeking harmony. Different to adversarial debate, it has its basis in African-based oral tradition. The use of call-and-response discourse needs the active participation of all. For ideas to be tested and validated, everyone in the group must participate. Black female centrality in families and community organisations provides AfAm women with a high degree of support for invoking dialogue as a dimension of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. This ties in with a female way of knowing.

3. The ethic of caring

"Talking with the heart" taps the ethic of caring - another dimension of an alternative epistemology used by AfAm females.

• Emphasis on individual uniqueness, rooted in a tradition of African humanism;
• Use of emotions in dialogues - emotion shows a speaker believes in the validity of an argument;
• capacity for empathy.

There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women's' experience as well.

4. The ethic of personal accountability

People are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. AfAms believe it is essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures.

It seems (with limited research) that there is a female model for moral development, therefore there is another convergence between Afrocentric and feminist institutions.

"An alternative epistemology challenges...knowledge an opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth".

My thoughts

Very interesting. I've heard talk of intersectionality on Twitter, and not really understood it (or taken much notice of it) until now. It seems clear to me that experiences and understandings will vary. What a middle class white woman conceives of as their feminist viewpoint will be different, though no more or less valid, than that of a Black woman. However, the Black/transgendered/with impairments will have additional barriers of oppression. It was fascinating to learn of different ways in which research can be viewed as 'valid', based on cultural roots. It's obvious that this should be so, but my own view has been blinkered by the standard white Eurocentric masculinist approach that it is very hard to conceive of alternative voices towards validity, as suggested here. Something to read  more about. It's unlikely to be something I develop, but it has made me more aware of the frames within which I operate, as being a privileged, white, cis-, able-bodied woman.

If I had to categorise Collins, it would be as a critical theorist, with one key concern being from a feminist viewpoint, though of course taking in other oppressed sections of society, particularly that of African-Americans. As a CT, she would espouse 'transformation'.

Weekend 1 reading: Smith and the problem of criteria

Smith, J. K. (1993). The problem of criteria. In: J. K. Smith (ed.). After the demise of empiricism. The problem of judging social and educational enquiry. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

This is another of the weekend 1 readings. Smith is an interpretivist. Again, as I don't really yet understand the topic, a lot of this is verbatim and will need to be paraphrased or quoted if I use it in work.

PEs, CTs and interpretivists can all agree:

• There's no definitive way to distinguish knowledge from opinion or from false claims;
• There's no definitive way to sift good research from bad.

All three paradigms agree that the empirical theory of knowledge is undermined by the fact that theory-free observation is impossible, and so on.

The end of the common ground

However, as the three theories have developed, so have major differences in their positions. The differences lie in the depth to which the PE ideas of theory-free knowledge, abandonment of direct realism and collapse of fact-value and subject-object distinctions are taken.

PEs: To develop a "modified" version of empiricism. They are unwilling to abandon completely the concepts of truth and objectivity as ideals. They suggest that, without these ideals, it is impossible to determine knowledge from opinion and good research from bad. They view the task as to modify empiricism rather than abandon it.

PEs have sought to develop the philosophical doctrine of realism, from 'naïve/direct' to 'sophisticated/indirect' realism. They also argue for the importance of certain values key to the scientific process, e.g. being guided by the 'search for truth'. They realise that certitude is impossible but one isn't railroaded into relativism; just because research cannot definitively be judged on its quality does not mean that some research is not more valid than others. "They are looking for a non-foundational theory of knowledge" between certitude and 'anything goes relativism' and between definitive criteria for judgement and no criteria at all.

CTs have attempted to develop an alternative foundation for knowledge, with alternative conceptions for truth, objectivity etc. Within CT, the ideal is to make transparent the historical socio-political forces that have led to false consciousness, distorted communication, etc. The knowledge must then be put to use so that the exploited can transform themselves and society. "CTs make no pretence that their theory is neutral or divorced from practical action".

The key task for CTs has been to develop a normative foundation for their position. Doing this, they've adopted a critical realism, interpreted objectivity and truth within a historical viewpoint, elaborated a theory of communicative action and rationality, etc. They do this knowing that certitude is impossible but that relativism  is unacceptable. They realise that judging research definitively is impossible but state that some research is more objective and valid than others. Their task has been to establish alternative criteria, alternative to empiricism, post-empiricism and interpretivism.

Interpretivists are guided by human solidarity. hey heavily discuss the 'no theory-free knowledge' concept, the collapse of subject/object dualism, the end of the distinction between facts and values, etc. They push further than PEs and CTs - they redefine traditional concepts such as subjective, objective, truth, relativism etc in non-epistemological terms.

The key position of interpretivists is that researchers do not have a unique hold on knowledge. We cannot judge, in a foundational or epistemological sense, knowledge against opinion. The best we can do is to describe forms of justification for knowledge that are common to a particular group or society at a particular time. Any judgements must be framed by practices and moral concerns, not epistemological ones.

Interpretivists believe that researchers are not privy to privileged knowledge about social life. A research study is thought of as another narrative account of our social lives, alongside other (research and lay) narrative accounts.

However, that is not to say that they believe all research is equally important or justified - they're not 'anything goes' relativists. However, this judgement is not made as to whether some research is more objective (giving an accurate depiction) but because some accounts make sense to us given our interests at this time and place. Judgements we make about knowledge against opinion and good against bad research are practical and moral tasks, not epistemological ones. Interpretivists must elaborate what lies beyond epistemology and beyond the thought that there are special abstract criteria for judging research quality.

1. The need to fill the vacuum left by empiricism with another theory of knowledge: PEs and CTs agree with this; we must be able to say something special about genuine knowledge against false claims and about good against bad research. Good research is defined in terms of objectivity. Interps do not desire to develop a theory of knowledge and believe that there is no vacuum to fill. The absence of a theory of knowledge does not mean that all claims to knowledge and all research are equal, but not better because they are more objective but what we can agree on at any given time/place.
2. Theories of knowledge differ between PEs and CTs. PEs want modified empiricism but CTs want an alternative basis for knowledge. Both have adopted realism and make claims to objectivity but have different concepts of these definitions. PEs see objectivity as true to reality as it exists. CTs seem objectivity in terms of historical distortions that have led to the present false consciousness. PEs believe that objectivity is a matter of detachment. CTs believe objectivity can only be understood in terms of commitment to the emancipation and empowerment of those who are unaware of the reality of their situations.

These differences are clearest when it comes to the interpretation of meaning, i.e. in hermeneutics.

PE make a distinction between meaning and significance. Meaning has independent existence and can be known (in principle if not in practice) at any given moment, as it actually is, separate from the interests and purposes of the interpreter. An objective account of what an author meant is one that has accurately captured that meaning. Meaning is given this status as an external referent point against which to assess interpretation; therefore we can assess the extent to which an interpreter has got it right or wrong.

Making this interpretation is not arbitrary. Using the regulative ideal of objectivity the author makes a hypothesis with a systematic approach. The extent to which the interpreter applies data collection and analysis can be judged. Furthermore, they explain how their subjectivities are made explicit and how discomfiting evidence was sought.

CTs make good on their versions of realism and objectivity with a critical or depth hermeneutics. Interpretation doesn't mean an accurate representation of the author's meaning, because the author may be mistaken. An objective interpretation points out to the victim of false consciousness the reasons for their illusions/distorted communication. In other words, an interpreter must depict what an author meant and also assess that meaning in light of objective historical conditions. This will lead to true meaning and the possibility that empowerment and emancipation will follow. Therefore, good critical research is that in which the researcher has been reflexive, clarified historical conditions, collaborated with those studied and educated meaning as to the true nature of their conditions.

Interps don't see hermeneutics in terms of theories, as they are not interested in theories of knowledge. They believe meaning only comes into being as a result of dialogue between the interpreter and that to be interpreted. There is therefore no objective or 'right' interpretation. However, this doesn't mean that there is no good or bad research - one interpretation is often agreed to be better than another. All one can do to convince another to accept their interpretation through providing materials that best support it. Interpretivists see criteria not as abstract standards but as open-ended evolving lists of traits that characterise what we think research should do and be like.

Criteria for judging social and educational research

PEs and CTs, based on their interest in a theory of knowledge, have both attempted to establish some form of abstract, general and universal criteria for distinguishing the quality of research.

PEs: Their realism leads them to judge that research which more accurately depicts reality (ie is more objective) from less accurate depictions (less objective). Whilst mistakes can be made, over time, with more research and analysis, more accurate judgements can be made. PEs differentiate between valid research and important/relevant research - this has been carried over from empiricism. Research can be of no practical or theoretical importance but can be valid through employing appropriate data collection and analysis and through thorough research. A view of importance is, necessarily, more subjective.

To CTs, good research must be both theoretically well developed and lead to emancipation and empowerment (i.e practically based). These are addressed through validity. Judgement is the extent to which the researcher accurately captures how people interpret their own expressions and those of others. This also needs to be understood in terms of the historical conditions that have led to these interpretations. Finally, good critical research must have catalytic validity - it must lead to or inspire practical action. Because of this, CTs are less likely to make a distinction between good research and important research. A researcher could objectively depict a person's interpretation and determine that the interpretation is mistaken or an illusion but not inspire people to act on that knowledge; therefore meeting the criterion of theoretical success but not that of practical agency, so it is invalid and unimportant.

Interpretivists: As the criteria problem is not an epistemological problem, criteria are not conceptualised as abstract standards. Instead, they are characterising traits. To argue that some research is good is to advance an argument for the particular traits that you think should characterise that study. Therefore decisions about the quality of an interpretive study draw on exemplars of that research tradition, involve judgemental interpretation and are a practical-moral affair.

Practical consequences

Within empiricism it was thought (in principle) that an objectivity of judgement about quality of research was possible. However, in reality, this was only ever loose and imprecise. PEs believe that although mistakes in judgement of research do occur, in the long haul, it will if it *is* good research, come to the forefront. This has implications for peer review of research journal articles.

P. 158: "It appears that there is little prospect for universal criteria to distinguish good research from bad" therefore there's little sense in the notion of a community of all researchers.

Potential concern related to the problem of criteria is the status of social and educational research/ers - no longer such as 'special or privileged knowledge', although it does still occur in PEs and CTs because of their self-reflection, openness to criticism, systematicness in thinking than non-researchers. Interpretivists shy away from this idea of a 'hierarchy of knowledge'. In the absence of a theory of knowledge there is no point worrying about a hierarchy of knowledge. There's no special knowledge about knowing and therefore no special, abstract way of distinguishing knowledge from opinion and good from bad research. Research is therefore knowledge that is different from, and expressed differently from the knowledge and language of the lay person. However, it is not superior knowledge - research is another voice in the conversation.

Summary

If PEs and CTs are correct that there is a theory of knowledge to replace the empiricist theory of knowledge, then there are abstract criteria/standards for distinguishing knowledge from belief and good from bad research. These criteria are loose and imprecise but are sufficient for the task of distinguishing good/bad research. Therefore these criteria can also serve as the basis for the claim that research knowledge is superior to other forms of knowledge - because it can be judged.

If there is no theory of knowledge (I.e. interpretivism) then there are no (epistemological) criteria for distinguishing good research from bad and knowledge from belief. Instead, there are characterising traits which are expressions of our values. The attempt to distinguish knowledge from opinion and good research from bad is a practical and moral task, not an epistemological one.

What  next? Questions to answer.

PEs: Standing between the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth, they have yet to come up with a convincing theory which draws from both. They also acknowledge their uncertainty about the role of empirical evidence in theory choice in light of there being no theory-free observation.

CTs: Can they justify that their critique is more than just another possibility (amongst many others) for understanding the social and educational world? Is their critique of ideology only another ideology? Have *they* escaped the historical distortions and false consciousness that everyone else is enveloped within?

Interps: Have they actually moved beyond a theory of knowledge, or just side-stepped it? "A judgement that a research study is good is never more than an expression of the fact that people, guided by the ideal of human solidarity, have come to agreement about the quality of that study".

What this means???

There's no agreement on the criteria that are used to consider what is good/bad research. Different groups use different means or even believe that there is no clear way except through agreement on characteristic traits at that moment in time.

CTs believe that change should occur. PEs do not seem that different from empiricists.