Weekend 3: Handwritten notes

Theorising data

The quality of theorising data is key in doctoral research. See Dean’s two papers to explore what it means to theorise something, for example application of Foucault’s ideas to policies surrounding safeguarding in sports coaching.

Rorty stats that “All we have is interpretation”, so all we have is differing interpretations of experiences. Should we strive towards truth, in its absence.

Jean-Luc Nancy explored the concept of “being with”: we cannot exist as individuals, as we are social beings. Our identity emerges through our interaction with others. Identity captures our engaging with others within particular contexts.

Judith Butler discussed performativity – we perform differently in different contexts. There is no ‘essence’ of ourselves.

We bring meaning to data – it is a process of construction of meaning. The data does not exist without the meaning and the significance we put on it. Context is of key significance, and helps us to produce meaning. There is construction of the context between interviewer and interviewee.
This links to reflexivity – the narrative of who we are, our aspects of self and our connections to the research.

There was a brief discussion over research data anomalies – it is of great interest to explore anomalous data rather than to try and ignore it. Why is it there? What does it mean in relation to the agreeing data?

 Key issues arising from the evening activity

Truth is plural – there are multiple truths.
Who we are and how we see influences our perception of truth. Our interpretations cause us to see the world differently. We privilege some things and deselect others – perception is very individual.
We need to relate this to our ontological and epistemological position.
Ontology is existence.

If truth is a plural concept, the ontological status is relativism. Interpretation is critical. We are not dealing with the ontological realism of a singularity of truth but a plurality of multiple truths.

BUT – does this mean ‘anything goes’? – The tutor asked us to question whether this was actually important. We always have to live with uncertainty, so why not with uncertainty over research. However, there are certain truths which hold sway at different times – these are not foundational but are based on community debate as to what is temporarily/provisionally held to count as ‘truth’. However, within this community, there may be different perspectives, with tensions between them. Therefore, there is no total agreement on interpretation/truth.

Other key issues:

Meaning does not reside in the data itself – meaning is brought into being and partly constructed through our interaction with it. The sense we make of data is affected by what we bring (culturally, socially, historically located) i.e. CONTEXT.

Discovery as a metaphor for research is inaccurate. It is more a construction and creation than a discovery. For example phenomenological hermeneutics acknowledge the importance of ‘self’ in the construction and telling of the ‘other’ – self and other are conjoined.
We cannot bracket off our subjectivity but we must embrace it – this is who I am and this affects how I understand and interpret.

Heidegger suggests that we are already located in presuppositions – ie our ‘being in the world’ – our social, historical, cultural context.

Nancy: ‘being with’ locates you – who you are with affects who you are.

Michael Polanyi discussed ‘tacit knowledge’: knowledge we cannot explicitly explain but that we have. We cannot render a feeling fully explicit (e.g. my choice of IPA?)

Other issues raised:

The criteria with which our research is judged: where I position myself in relation to onto-epistemic issues. I  need to articulate how I want to be judged – I will need to discuss the criteria for judgement.

Conventional criteria do not apply in qualitative contexts. Remodelling of the criteria to include, for example, authenticity and verisimilitude are still ‘fudging’ the issue – still appealing to accuracy but by different names. We only have the power of rhetoric to take the reader into your word – you need resonance with the reader, and this will not always happen.

What you write will only ever ring true for some people. Validity shifts from accuracy to a plain that recognises the importance of resonance and experience – connection to the information. This is not a simplistic correspondence, such as ‘does the report accurately represent reality?’

This shifts the test of validity – the truth of the account partly resides in the standpoint of the reader. Truth isn’t solely controlled by the authorial account.

Dean is going to send out a paper on the flexibility of validity.

Presentation (PowerPoint) on Heidegerrian Phenomenology

Slide 1:

Ò  … utilises a hermeneutic approach that is fundamentally ontological

Ò  This informs us of ‘how’ a ‘what’ is to be treated, and is primarily methodological

Ò  ‘what does this data mean’ becomes ‘how is this data meaningful’?

The activity we took part in was fundamentally ontological – we drew on our own being. The questions move from ‘what does this mean’ to ‘how is this meaningful?’ – our interaction and construction bring meaning into being.

 Slide 2:

Ò  The latter cannot be answered except in relation to Dasein (da – here; sein – being)

Ò  Thus, descriptions are impossible without interpretation

Ò  ‘the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation’ (Heidegger 1962: 61).

Descriptions are impossible without interpretation and construction of meaning. Our identities (plural rather than singular) are exposed differently depending on our ‘being with’. Identities are contextually located.

Slide 3:

Ò  Being and becoming are hermeneutic:

Ò   ‘the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial significance of the word, where it designates this business of interpreting’ (Heidegger 1962: 62).

Becoming: Being isn’t fixed – it is dynamic. We ‘become’ according to those around us – it is relational.

Slide 4:

Ò  Interpretation is ‘grounded in something we have in advance fore-having … we see in advance fore-sight … and something we grasp in advance fore-conception (Heidegger 1962: 193)

Ò  The implication for research is that data is analysed through these fore-structures

Ò  Such structures suggest that understanding is not ground in data but in what people have in advance – the always already Being

‘Fore-having’ – we have ‘fore-conception’ – we analyse data through these fore-structures. The understanding is not grounded in data but in being and fore-having – i.e. we have preconceptions and ‘baggage’.

Therefore, research is always already theoretically over-determined – we are always already theoretical as we are always already schooled in some sense, e.g. through family, community, culture, tradition. We cannot bracket that.

 Slide 5:

Ò  Key points

Ò  The object and subject of the world are inseparable

Ò   Dasein is the Being that is peculiar to humans who must paradoxically live in relationships while simultaneously being ultimately alone with oneself

Ò  To understand the Other, a person’s behaviour or expressions, one has to study that person in context

It is impossible to know when what is outside of ourselves starts and what is internal begins in regard to interpretation. Interpretation is an interaction but we cannot pin it down. We cannot recognise the extent of our self. Ethically, this is very powerful as we as the author have to consider equity, responsibility, whose voices we choose to privilege and whose we silence.

Reflexivity involves engaging critically with what we recognise as our position and subjectivity, to interrogate but we will always fail as we cannot fully recognise the extent of our influence.

Reflexivity: positioning our professional values that are shared with the contextualisation of the work.

Grounded Theory

Slide 1:

… addresses the ‘important enterprise of how the discovery of theory from data - systematically obtained and analyzed in social research - can be furthered’

Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative research, London:  Aldine, p.1).

Glaser & Strauss (1967): The discovery of theory from data

Theories from the study are based on data – theories emerged from the data, i.e. the authors weren’t bringing anything to it – the data drove the themes. This assumes that we enter the context of research without baggage, in order to see what’s occurring. It assumes that no literature has been read beforehand, there are no lenses to see through, allowing data to drive theory production – data “springs forth”. BUT there is no acknowledgement of a lens.

 

Slide 2:

—  … relies upon ‘a general method of comparative analysis’ (p.1)

‘we would all agree that in social research generating theory goes hand in hand with verifying it’ (p.2).

This is problematic as it suggests that there is logical induction. Karl Popper critiques logical induction through the black swan story. There is no way of verifying a theory based on induction. There is always the possibility of an anomaly in the next observation. We can only ever falsify a theory rather than verify it.

How can we ever know how close we are to ‘the truth’? Verify against what? We cannot know how near or far we are from a ‘truth’.

The categories we develop in our minds are influenced by our framing of the context. We cannot verify it – if something (a theme) keeps repeating itself, it is because we keep seeing it. We may not see other things.

There is a tension in grounded theory – it wants us to be open-minded, inductive and generative BUT it is also seeking to verify – that is, it is narrowing, reductive and deductive.

What are the external references allowing us to verify something, other than keeping seeing the same thing? – affirmation of the self.

 

Slide 3:

—  According to Glaser and Strauss – grounded theory appeals to the ‘interrelated jobs of theory in sociology:

                (1) to enable prediction and explanation of         behaviour; (2) to be useful in theoretical advance in                 sociology; (3) to be usable in practical applications –        prediction and explanation should be able to give                 the practitioner understanding and some control of        situation; (4) to provide a perspective on behaviour                 – a stance to be taken towards data; and (5) to guide and provide a style for research on particular         areas of behaviour’ (p.3).

“Prediction and explanation” come up several times in these assumptions – these align with the key concepts of positivism. This holds to the view that there is a ‘real view’ of the world – theory is developed on that basis and we can remove our subjectivity, so in reality, GT is positivist.

Slide 5:

—  Located where? … possibly conceptual tensions?

—  Used in education research, nursing and organisational studies, but also elsewhere

—  Has much in common with ethnography, case study, action research

—  Rejection of a priori theorising – emergent theory

—  Implicit verification-ism

—  Not steeped in literature

—  Inductive, constructivist approach to data collection

—  Imperative to reach saturation, but why?

—  Interaction between data collection, analysis and theory building – ‘theory must “fit” the situation being researched’ (p.3)

Features of grounded theory: It is unsure where it sits – there are conceptual tensions. It rejects a priori theorising.

Slide 6:

—  ‘Categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under study; by “work” we mean that they must be meaningfully relevant to and be able to explain the behaviour under study

—  … categories are discovered by examination of the data’ (p. 3).

—  ‘the adequacy of a theory for sociology today cannot be divorced from the process by which it is generated’ (p.5).

To generate theory…

GT suggests that the meaning/theme is already there, and is not imposed by the self. But how can this be separate? We interact (with our baggage) – they suggest that this doesn’t happen and that the categories are there *before* our interaction.

Slide 8:

—  ‘The biographies of scientists are replete with stories of occasional flashes of insight, of seminal ideas, garnered from sources outside the data. But the generation of theory from such insights must then be brought into relation to the data, or there is great danger that theory and the empirical world will mismatch’ (p.6)

What is the ‘empirical world’ – we only know the phenomenal one through our own senses and constructions.

NOTE: The tutor did mention the work of CHarmaz with regard to grounded theory, but suggested that her developments took it away from grounded theory and it was closer to phenomenology.

What makes good quality qualitative research for me?

The first readings I had to complete for my first EdD weekend all revolved around the concept of the validity of research. How do we measure (if indeed we can?) what “good” qualitative research is? There were a range of viewpoints, depending on the philosophical and methodological viewpoints of the authors. I could see that each made sense in its own context. However, I didn’t really have any background understanding to critique the ideas adequately, and nor did I then know which way my own research would take me.

Since then, I’ve made the decision to use IPA, and feel comfortable with the relationship between this and my own views on truth and knowledge. I’ve been thinking back as to how I can ensure the quality of the research I am about to undertake. In my quantitative research past, I’ve been concerned over methods, statistics, reproducibility etc. But now, as they say, for something completely different.

Smith and the other IPA stalwarts discuss quality, but in my limited timescale and support for this small scale research, use of other people to determine whether my interpretations are appropriate is not possible. I’ve seen several papers mention Yardley (2000) in relation to quality, so I’ve had a look at her paper. Her thoughts are interesting and relevant, and above all, achievable in my timescale.

Yardley, L. (2000). Dilemmas in qualitative health research. Psychology and Health, 15(2), 215-228. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08870440008400302

The suggested reason for the increase in the use of qualitative methodologies (QMs) in health psychology is that it provides a detailed exploration of the experiences of the participant. Yardley clearly identifies that these are true methodologies, with differing underlying assumptions, rather than just a proliferation of methods of data collection and analysis.

The author highlights the reason for the paper as to how to evaluate qualitative research. She suggests that there is a gap in the understanding of how to evaluate qualitative studies in accredited health psychology. Yardley identifies that qualitative research is defined as ‘not quantitative’, rather than the diverse range of qualitative methodologies having a unified definition. Even within a single tradition, such as phenomenology, there is diversity in its assumptions and approaches.

Yardley suggests that it is the very subjectivity allowed by qualitative work that leads to it being used so extensively. However, because meaning is constructed and negotiate between researcher and participant, the imposition of set criteria for truth would restrict the construction of knowledge and could prejudice particular groups who subscribe to alternative criteria for truth. Therefore, a standardised procedure for performing qualitative methodologies cannot be entertained.

There is a concern in the field of health psychology that QMs most closely resembling quantitative methodologies are gaining precedence over other methods because of familiarity in terms of quality and measurements/assessments of validity. Another concern is a tendency to be drawn towards those methodologies providing a framework within which to complete research, leading to isolated methodologies without the flexibility to understand the benefits of other approaches.

This is something which does niggle away at me. I’m not really fully sure why I chose IPA as a methodology. It seemed ‘right’ for the question I wanted to answer. However, I do wonder whether I am drawn to it because, compared to other methodologies, it seems to provide a ‘process’ through which to work. The guidelines are broad and inclusive, but nevertheless, perhaps I am clinging to the set procedures of quantitative research. Perhaps in later work I should explore some in more detail other areas of phenomenology such as van Manen.

Yardley discusses the issue of quality control, suggesting that we cannot apply quantitative standards of quality, such as representative sampling, reliability and replicability, to QMs. These would be unlikely to be achievable and may also not be desirable. She believes that structured coding and interpretation fashioned by rules means that there is a loss of nuance in the rich data provided by QMs. Nevertheless, a means of ascertaining the quality of qualitative research is needed, so that the work can be judged accordingly.

The author identifies what she believes are four characteristics of good quality research, along with some examples of how these can be achieved. The four characteristics are:

1.       Sensitivity to context;

2.       Commitment and rigour;

3.       Transparency and coherence;

4.       Impact and importance.

Yardley suggests these characteristics but stresses that they are not meant to be applied rigidly. Indeed in order to be useable in a range of QMs they must be flexible.

Sensitivity to context:

The author acknowledges the vital aspect of context within qualitative research. However, whilst it is important to have an understanding of related theories and relevant literature, this knowledge must not cloud the researcher’s interpretation of the data. Areas of divergence from theory must be sufficiently explored, as well as those data which do link the specific study to more abstract theories and generalisations discussed in previous research.

The social and cultural context of participants and researchers must also be considered. Contextualisation of findings can shed new light on meanings. The social context of the data gathering needs to be considered including the shared understandings and conversations between researcher and participant and consideration of the researcher’s position in relation to the participant is vital.

A concern for the perceived power imbalance between researcher and participant is required. Whilst some QMs seek the viewpoint of the participants on the researcher’s interpretations to determine the ‘truth’ of the interpretation (perhaps an example of this is the Patricia Hill Collins reading from week 1), it must be remembered that the opinions of the participant should not over-ride the academic independence of the researcher.

Commitment:

Commitment is suggested through the longer-term involvement of the researcher with the topic being researched, as well as an appropriate ability in the methodology of research and immersion within the data.

Rigour:

This is, Yardley suggests, indicated by the completeness of the data analysis and a sufficient amount of data collection. This will vary depending on the chosen methodology – grounded theory will require more participants than IPA. Within phenomenological research, there should be sufficient depth of interpretation, not just surface level analysis.

Transparency and coherence:

This explores the persuasiveness of the research in constructing a reality. Another area to consider to provide coherence is whether the research question and the philosophical underpinnings of the research are appropriate.

Transparency is achieved through thorough documentation of the process of data collection and analysis and provision of rich data, that is, extensive excerpts. Within IPA, it’s my understanding that this is at least in part provided by the tables of themes and annotated transcripts produced as part of the analysis process. Reflexivity is also needed to demonstrate transparency – identifying the experiences and motivations which underlie the research.

Impact and importance:

The impact of the research is a key factor in determining its value. The value may be theoretical but may also have a wider impact within other fields. There may also be a socio-cultural impact to the research. Yardley suggests that an advantage for QMs in health research is their close link to practice. This would, presumably, be similar within educational research.

Yardley concludes by stressing the importance of integrity in QM, whilst taking into account the diversity of these methodologies.

Further reading?

Stern (1997) Strategies for overcoming the rage of rejection. In Morse (ed.), Completing a qualitative project: details and dialogue (pp. 135-145). This covers how to get over editors rejecting work for publication. Its relevance is, perhaps, stressing that you need to clearly demonstrate to the reviewer/reader how you expect your research to be measured against concepts of quality. If you're explicit, there's less room for misunderstanding.

On the right track!

I had a meeting with the module tutor today, about my proposed research for the Research Methods module To say I was nervous was an understatement! I sort of expected to be quizzed on my ontological and epistemological standpoint and be questioned on my choice (seemingly random) of methodology.

But no. Hurrah! I gave an overview of my background and interest and then of my research question. The tutor started off by saying it was a widely studied area, so my immediate concern was that there would be no further area to study. The tutor reeled off list after list of reports surrounding the area of vocational qualifications and their perception in relation to A levels. These I'll have to acquaint/reacquaint myself with:

- Higginson report on A levels in 1988
- Tomlinson report which was quashed by the Blair/Brown government in the run up to the 2010 election
He suggested that I tap into the long history on the topic of vocational qualifications and their role in equipping young people to become career-ready, for example Leitch's Review of Skills

He also suggested I read up on Michael Young: A Curriculum for the 21st Century? Towards a New Basis for Overcoming Academic/Vocational Divisions (can't currently access this online anywhere).

We also discussed (well, I listened...) Foucault's discursive practices relating to policy, with the suggestion that policies speak into existence the behaviours and understandings of us all. Policies inform practice and there is a sovereignty of academic qualifications over vocational qualifications; students come to believe in this 'truth' through socialisation.

With regard to the use of IPA, the tutor was happy for me to use this methodology. He stressed the importance of location of my self within the research, and suggested that I ensure disclosure of my background, in the introduction, to identify the lens through which I view and interpret the research. This will be discussed in relation to the theory of reflexivity My own thought is that I need to mention bracketing, if only to explain why I discount it. Furthermore, something I haven't mentioned previously, is that I am the first generation of the family to go to university. This is something worth mentioning. Currently, I remain the only member of my side of t he family to do so.

SO, where am I? In a happier place about my thoughts about how to go about this assignment and research project.

What do I need to do now?
- Reconsider my assignment plan to incorporate policies/discursive practices
- Consider adding info on the various reports highlighted
- Develop my location of self
- Get cracking on the ethics side of things! This is what may well hold me up.

Revisiting Eisner

Eisner was one of my Week 1 readings. As I gradually start to write the assignment, I find myself revisiting Sparkes etc., but have only just returned to Eisner.

See here for the original post.

My thoughts on this second reading are as follows. I've basically summarised each paragraph, in order t0 gather key points.

Eisner starts the paper by giving an overview of what is meant by objectivity - setting the coconuts up for him to later knock down. He discusses the hierarchy of objectivity over subjectivity - something he comes back to later, in relation to our culture and history. After discussing the struggle for objectivity, he sets his argument against it before defining objectivity in relation to ontology, and linking it to the correspondence theory of truth. Eisner brings in Rorty when he talks about there having to be a correspondence in perception, understanding and representation. Rorty is discussed by the use of his analogy of this representation being a mirror to nature.

Procedural objectivity is dismissed by Eisner, suggesting its inhumanity. He then summarises the argument against subjectivity, setting the argument up for attack in the following paragraph. How comes his argument - and how he will knock down the arguments for objectivity. He suggests that we cannot actually know that we know 'the truth'. Just because we can predict, doesn't mean that we know the truth.

It is important to realise that perception is always based on personal frameworks, so cannot be objective. Quote, p. 12: "What we come to see depends upon what we seek, and what we seek depends upon what we know how to say". This is something I'd like to discuss in the assignment.

The way we represent knowledge will also affect how it is perceived; whatever we do, we will conceal as well as reveal. Group perceptions of reality, through schemata, again  mean we cannot be objective. Procedural objectivity only suggests agreement rather than truth.

So, having destroyed the idea of objectivity, what does Eisner suggest?

Historically and culturally, we are programmed to see objectivity as a requirement and higher than subjectivity. He suggests we look for an alternative. Subjectivity is not 'anything goes' but is based on our personal frames of reference, from our own experiences that we make. If there is lack of a common framework, then communication will be impossible.

Eisner suggests that we should not be afraid of the plurality of worlds that his ideas suggest. Our understanding of truth changes as we make it. We can also consider alternative means fro perceiving truth, e.g. through fiction rather than 'science'.

He then starts to summarise his argument, that objectivity is unachievable. Science and the world have changed. We  must look to recognise the plurality of truth, and use reason to determine truth, not rely on correspondence.

My thoughts now:

I can use the quote and its surrounding information to support my view of subjectivity being appropriate and linked to the research paradigm I'm using. I can also bring in the frameworks area and link, perhaps to reflexivity.

I still can't find the original to Philips' work, but having re-read the blog post, it seems that there is a lot of agreement between Philips and Eisner. However, Philips is convinced that objectivity is achievable through peer review and effective procedures in research. The crux of the argument appears to be around the definition of objectivity, with Eisner linking it clearly to truth. Philips, on the other hand, talks about research being objective but not necessarily true. However, this is my interpretation of someone else's view of the paper, so I need to be careful.

It was useful to revisit this paper and to think about how I can apply the information to my research.

More IPA - still no idea why I'm keen

I've read a little more about the 'nitty gritty' of IPA, as well as some more background on its history and theory. Daunting, but still I haven't come across a reason why I shouldn't pursue this path. My main concern, I suppose, is that a lot of the literature relates to its use in psychology/health psychology rather than in education. If you search, there is a range of material out these using it in education, albeit relatively recent. I've not got a real idea on the quality of the material either.

Incidentally, while I'm making some notes about assignment 1 (and potential dissertation thoughts), I've come across some reference to Tinto's student retention/departure models, which merit further investigation. (Also, Austin's theory on student involvement - not looked into this at all at the moment). These could be of use, depending on what my research finds. I need to keep them in mind. However, I'm not sure, if I use IPA, whether I should be 'free' of theories until after I have done my first lot of analysis - I may potentially organise my questions to support the theories I'm considering aligning my thoughts to.

Anyway, enough navel-gazing. My most recent reading (usual caveats apply - I'll need to paraphrase before use):

Larkin, M., Watts, S., & Clifton, E. (2006). Giving voice and making sense in Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3, 102-120.

Abstract

IPA involves the phenomenological requirement to understand and give voice to the concerns of participants. The interpretative requirement to contextualise and 'make sense' of the claims and concerns. The paper looks to explore the relationship between the phenomenological and interpretative aspects of IPA. It covers the epistemological range of IPAs interpretative focus and its relationship to the more descriptive features of phenomenological analysis. Drawing upon concepts from Heideggerian phenomenology the paper situates its conclusions within a contextualist position.

Introduction: IPA

There is a belief that IPA is 'simply descriptive'. However, it is only seen as this as it is a flexible, accessible and applicable tool. This is not to say that it is without vigour. To be done correctly the novice researcher must be aware that its inherent flexibility may make other,  more prescriptive, methods 'safer'. The authors believe that IPA is a powerful method when carried out correctly.

The idea that IPA is 'simple' may stem from Conrad's use of the words "insider's perspective" and is invariably used to describe others' work with IPA. To be able to gain an "insider's perspective" requires thought. Some IPA research, particularly in health psychology, has avoided interpretation of data and the formation of concepts. This oversimplification can make IPA seem superficial.

IPA research is ideographic - it focuses on the individual. That is not to say that findings from IPA studies cannot be applied more widely, but that this wider application is not very generalizable (??? - my own thoughts - need to clarify and then support!)

IPA studies, methodologically, produce an intensive and detailed analysis of a relatively small number of participants. A range of methods can be used to gather data, including semi-structured interviews. Findings are reported thematically. The process is flexible and similar to other qualitative methods.

There is a phenomenological emphasis on the lived experience of the participants. The IPA researcher must seek to understand the world of the participant and to describe it. However, our experience of the participant's world can only ever be partial - the account is constructed by both participant and researcher. Nevertheless, the researcher's aim is to reproduce a view as close as possible to that of the participant. The second stage (double hermeneutics) is to perform an interpretative analysis. Here, the researcher takes into account the wider social, cultural and theoretical context when revisiting the description. The interpretation "aims to provide a critical and conceptual commentary upon the participants' personal 'sense-making' activities'" (p. 104). The researchers can consider 'what it means for the participant to have made these claims and expressed themselves within this situation. within this, the researcher may draw upon existing theoretical constructs'. So here, I've answered my question about whether/when to draw on existing theory such as Tinto, Bourdieu (if they are relevant!).

The paper expands on the phenomenological and interpretative aspects of IPA. The background is drawn from Heidegger and hermeneutics. There follows a discussion on the role of IPA in qualitative psychology.

Husserl, Heidegger and phenomenology as the study of persons-in-context

I'm going to have to review other papers on Husserl vs Heidegger, as I don't really understand this. Husserl made human consciousness central to his analyses. He also believed in the role of bracketing.
Heidegger was concerned that a person is always a 'person-in-context': "We are a fundamental part of a meaningful world and the meaningful world is a fundamental part of us". We can only be understood as a function of our involvement within the world and the world can only be understood as a function of our interactions with it.

Heidegger rejects Cartesian dualism of separate subject and object. He develops the concept of 'Dasein' ('there being'/'being there') - by nature we are 'there', i.e. somewhere, always located within a specific context.

Ontological and epistemological bases for investigating the person-in-context

It is not possible to remove ourselves, our thoughts, our meaning systems, from the world 2to find out an objective truth". However, this is not to say that we  live within a relativistic kedgeree of thought. "What is real is not dependent upon us, but questions about the nature of their reality can only occur because we ask the question". "Things" cannot be revealed unless they are brought meaningfully into the context of human life. Any discoveries we make are just a function of the relationship between researcher and subject. The 'reality' which emerges from the work depends upon how it is constructed by the researcher.

To gain answers of value, we need to reflexively consider the most appropriate questions to ask. A key concept of IPA is using 'sensitivity and responsiveness' to provide useful outcomes. Sensitivity and responsiveness are key to the phenomenological context of this method/stance. This allows the participant to show themselves as themselves and reveal any subject matter on their own terms.

The paper discusses the "empathetic" treatment of the subject, but consider this against the paper on hermeneutic listening - an inappropriate word?

IPA and persons-in-context

IPA is interested in how a particular person experiences and understands the idea of interest. Our interest is in their perception of the subject rather than the subject itself. This is a really important idea to remember. This is what makes it such an interesting method/stance. We know that we can't get to the truth, so we seek a truth, as seen by the participant. We need to consider their truth in light of historical/social etc contexts - the interpretative part of IPA. "An account can be used to reveal something about a person, but only that person's current positioning in relation to the world of objects which have come to constitute the subject in their experience, culture and locale". The analyst must therefore focus on the person-in-context (a particular person in a particular context) and that person's relatedness to the 'phenomena at hand' is the topic we are interested in. "That is, we are interested in how they understand and make sense of their experiences in terms of their relatedness to, and their engagement with, those phenomena."

An account produced by a participant can be used thematically to reveal something real about the object we are studying. "In choosing IPA for a research project, we commit ourselves to exploring, describing, interpreting, and situating the means by which our participants make sense of their experiences" (p. 110). This is contextualism (Madill et al., 2000).

Giving voice: The 'phenomenological goal' demonstrated

Heideggerian phenomenology requires us to identify, describe and understand the 'objects of concern' in the participant's world and the 'experiential claims' made by the participant. These are the key feature of the first order, descriptive, coding in IPA. The authors give an example - Nigel. They study him in order to capture something "of what is important" to him in this context and with this topic at hand. The key element for Nigel is money - it permeates his words.

Making sense - the 'interpretative repertoire' revisited

IPA wants to go further than description; not least because it is hard to identify where description ends and interpretation begins. IPA goes beyond description as it focuses on sense-making activities and our 'involvement in the world'. Interpreting what it means for the participant to have such concerns, within their specific context.

Hermeneutics does not subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth. It assumes that any interpretation involving a hermeneutic circle in which the interpreter's perspective and understanding initially shape their interpretation, but that interpretation, as it reacts with the phenomena of interest, is open to revision and elaboration as the perspective and understanding of the interpreter, including their biases and blind spots, are revealed and evaluated.

P. 114: IPA has been developed to allow the researcher to produce a theoretical framework based upon, but capable of exceeding, the participant's own terminology and conceptualisations. The approach seeks to generate an 'insider's perspective' but no single theoretical assumption about how that perspective may be interpreted.

A range of analytical strategies can be used during interpretation. Anything used needs: carefully formulated research questions and subsequent analysis; a willingness to reflect on the process of data collection and analysis; a contextualised account.

Summary

IPA has developed as a set of core ideas (idiographic, phenomenological, interpretative analysis, with first person accounts as data, etc.). Some areas are flexible, e.g. epistemology procedure. It combines rich description of a phenomenological 'core' (aiming to capture something of the 'person-in-context'), with more speculative development of an interpretative account - the meaning of the claims and concerns.

Weekend 1 reading: Smith and the problem of criteria

Smith, J. K. (1993). The problem of criteria. In: J. K. Smith (ed.). After the demise of empiricism. The problem of judging social and educational enquiry. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

This is another of the weekend 1 readings. Smith is an interpretivist. Again, as I don't really yet understand the topic, a lot of this is verbatim and will need to be paraphrased or quoted if I use it in work.

PEs, CTs and interpretivists can all agree:

• There's no definitive way to distinguish knowledge from opinion or from false claims;
• There's no definitive way to sift good research from bad.

All three paradigms agree that the empirical theory of knowledge is undermined by the fact that theory-free observation is impossible, and so on.

The end of the common ground

However, as the three theories have developed, so have major differences in their positions. The differences lie in the depth to which the PE ideas of theory-free knowledge, abandonment of direct realism and collapse of fact-value and subject-object distinctions are taken.

PEs: To develop a "modified" version of empiricism. They are unwilling to abandon completely the concepts of truth and objectivity as ideals. They suggest that, without these ideals, it is impossible to determine knowledge from opinion and good research from bad. They view the task as to modify empiricism rather than abandon it.

PEs have sought to develop the philosophical doctrine of realism, from 'naïve/direct' to 'sophisticated/indirect' realism. They also argue for the importance of certain values key to the scientific process, e.g. being guided by the 'search for truth'. They realise that certitude is impossible but one isn't railroaded into relativism; just because research cannot definitively be judged on its quality does not mean that some research is not more valid than others. "They are looking for a non-foundational theory of knowledge" between certitude and 'anything goes relativism' and between definitive criteria for judgement and no criteria at all.

CTs have attempted to develop an alternative foundation for knowledge, with alternative conceptions for truth, objectivity etc. Within CT, the ideal is to make transparent the historical socio-political forces that have led to false consciousness, distorted communication, etc. The knowledge must then be put to use so that the exploited can transform themselves and society. "CTs make no pretence that their theory is neutral or divorced from practical action".

The key task for CTs has been to develop a normative foundation for their position. Doing this, they've adopted a critical realism, interpreted objectivity and truth within a historical viewpoint, elaborated a theory of communicative action and rationality, etc. They do this knowing that certitude is impossible but that relativism  is unacceptable. They realise that judging research definitively is impossible but state that some research is more objective and valid than others. Their task has been to establish alternative criteria, alternative to empiricism, post-empiricism and interpretivism.

Interpretivists are guided by human solidarity. hey heavily discuss the 'no theory-free knowledge' concept, the collapse of subject/object dualism, the end of the distinction between facts and values, etc. They push further than PEs and CTs - they redefine traditional concepts such as subjective, objective, truth, relativism etc in non-epistemological terms.

The key position of interpretivists is that researchers do not have a unique hold on knowledge. We cannot judge, in a foundational or epistemological sense, knowledge against opinion. The best we can do is to describe forms of justification for knowledge that are common to a particular group or society at a particular time. Any judgements must be framed by practices and moral concerns, not epistemological ones.

Interpretivists believe that researchers are not privy to privileged knowledge about social life. A research study is thought of as another narrative account of our social lives, alongside other (research and lay) narrative accounts.

However, that is not to say that they believe all research is equally important or justified - they're not 'anything goes' relativists. However, this judgement is not made as to whether some research is more objective (giving an accurate depiction) but because some accounts make sense to us given our interests at this time and place. Judgements we make about knowledge against opinion and good against bad research are practical and moral tasks, not epistemological ones. Interpretivists must elaborate what lies beyond epistemology and beyond the thought that there are special abstract criteria for judging research quality.

1. The need to fill the vacuum left by empiricism with another theory of knowledge: PEs and CTs agree with this; we must be able to say something special about genuine knowledge against false claims and about good against bad research. Good research is defined in terms of objectivity. Interps do not desire to develop a theory of knowledge and believe that there is no vacuum to fill. The absence of a theory of knowledge does not mean that all claims to knowledge and all research are equal, but not better because they are more objective but what we can agree on at any given time/place.
2. Theories of knowledge differ between PEs and CTs. PEs want modified empiricism but CTs want an alternative basis for knowledge. Both have adopted realism and make claims to objectivity but have different concepts of these definitions. PEs see objectivity as true to reality as it exists. CTs seem objectivity in terms of historical distortions that have led to the present false consciousness. PEs believe that objectivity is a matter of detachment. CTs believe objectivity can only be understood in terms of commitment to the emancipation and empowerment of those who are unaware of the reality of their situations.

These differences are clearest when it comes to the interpretation of meaning, i.e. in hermeneutics.

PE make a distinction between meaning and significance. Meaning has independent existence and can be known (in principle if not in practice) at any given moment, as it actually is, separate from the interests and purposes of the interpreter. An objective account of what an author meant is one that has accurately captured that meaning. Meaning is given this status as an external referent point against which to assess interpretation; therefore we can assess the extent to which an interpreter has got it right or wrong.

Making this interpretation is not arbitrary. Using the regulative ideal of objectivity the author makes a hypothesis with a systematic approach. The extent to which the interpreter applies data collection and analysis can be judged. Furthermore, they explain how their subjectivities are made explicit and how discomfiting evidence was sought.

CTs make good on their versions of realism and objectivity with a critical or depth hermeneutics. Interpretation doesn't mean an accurate representation of the author's meaning, because the author may be mistaken. An objective interpretation points out to the victim of false consciousness the reasons for their illusions/distorted communication. In other words, an interpreter must depict what an author meant and also assess that meaning in light of objective historical conditions. This will lead to true meaning and the possibility that empowerment and emancipation will follow. Therefore, good critical research is that in which the researcher has been reflexive, clarified historical conditions, collaborated with those studied and educated meaning as to the true nature of their conditions.

Interps don't see hermeneutics in terms of theories, as they are not interested in theories of knowledge. They believe meaning only comes into being as a result of dialogue between the interpreter and that to be interpreted. There is therefore no objective or 'right' interpretation. However, this doesn't mean that there is no good or bad research - one interpretation is often agreed to be better than another. All one can do to convince another to accept their interpretation through providing materials that best support it. Interpretivists see criteria not as abstract standards but as open-ended evolving lists of traits that characterise what we think research should do and be like.

Criteria for judging social and educational research

PEs and CTs, based on their interest in a theory of knowledge, have both attempted to establish some form of abstract, general and universal criteria for distinguishing the quality of research.

PEs: Their realism leads them to judge that research which more accurately depicts reality (ie is more objective) from less accurate depictions (less objective). Whilst mistakes can be made, over time, with more research and analysis, more accurate judgements can be made. PEs differentiate between valid research and important/relevant research - this has been carried over from empiricism. Research can be of no practical or theoretical importance but can be valid through employing appropriate data collection and analysis and through thorough research. A view of importance is, necessarily, more subjective.

To CTs, good research must be both theoretically well developed and lead to emancipation and empowerment (i.e practically based). These are addressed through validity. Judgement is the extent to which the researcher accurately captures how people interpret their own expressions and those of others. This also needs to be understood in terms of the historical conditions that have led to these interpretations. Finally, good critical research must have catalytic validity - it must lead to or inspire practical action. Because of this, CTs are less likely to make a distinction between good research and important research. A researcher could objectively depict a person's interpretation and determine that the interpretation is mistaken or an illusion but not inspire people to act on that knowledge; therefore meeting the criterion of theoretical success but not that of practical agency, so it is invalid and unimportant.

Interpretivists: As the criteria problem is not an epistemological problem, criteria are not conceptualised as abstract standards. Instead, they are characterising traits. To argue that some research is good is to advance an argument for the particular traits that you think should characterise that study. Therefore decisions about the quality of an interpretive study draw on exemplars of that research tradition, involve judgemental interpretation and are a practical-moral affair.

Practical consequences

Within empiricism it was thought (in principle) that an objectivity of judgement about quality of research was possible. However, in reality, this was only ever loose and imprecise. PEs believe that although mistakes in judgement of research do occur, in the long haul, it will if it *is* good research, come to the forefront. This has implications for peer review of research journal articles.

P. 158: "It appears that there is little prospect for universal criteria to distinguish good research from bad" therefore there's little sense in the notion of a community of all researchers.

Potential concern related to the problem of criteria is the status of social and educational research/ers - no longer such as 'special or privileged knowledge', although it does still occur in PEs and CTs because of their self-reflection, openness to criticism, systematicness in thinking than non-researchers. Interpretivists shy away from this idea of a 'hierarchy of knowledge'. In the absence of a theory of knowledge there is no point worrying about a hierarchy of knowledge. There's no special knowledge about knowing and therefore no special, abstract way of distinguishing knowledge from opinion and good from bad research. Research is therefore knowledge that is different from, and expressed differently from the knowledge and language of the lay person. However, it is not superior knowledge - research is another voice in the conversation.

Summary

If PEs and CTs are correct that there is a theory of knowledge to replace the empiricist theory of knowledge, then there are abstract criteria/standards for distinguishing knowledge from belief and good from bad research. These criteria are loose and imprecise but are sufficient for the task of distinguishing good/bad research. Therefore these criteria can also serve as the basis for the claim that research knowledge is superior to other forms of knowledge - because it can be judged.

If there is no theory of knowledge (I.e. interpretivism) then there are no (epistemological) criteria for distinguishing good research from bad and knowledge from belief. Instead, there are characterising traits which are expressions of our values. The attempt to distinguish knowledge from opinion and good research from bad is a practical and moral task, not an epistemological one.

What  next? Questions to answer.

PEs: Standing between the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth, they have yet to come up with a convincing theory which draws from both. They also acknowledge their uncertainty about the role of empirical evidence in theory choice in light of there being no theory-free observation.

CTs: Can they justify that their critique is more than just another possibility (amongst many others) for understanding the social and educational world? Is their critique of ideology only another ideology? Have *they* escaped the historical distortions and false consciousness that everyone else is enveloped within?

Interps: Have they actually moved beyond a theory of knowledge, or just side-stepped it? "A judgement that a research study is good is never more than an expression of the fact that people, guided by the ideal of human solidarity, have come to agreement about the quality of that study".

What this means???

There's no agreement on the criteria that are used to consider what is good/bad research. Different groups use different means or even believe that there is no clear way except through agreement on characteristic traits at that moment in time.

CTs believe that change should occur. PEs do not seem that different from empiricists.

The truth? A truth? Multiple truths? No truth?

The following notes come from the hand-written notes I made on Saturday 3rd Oct 2015. It may not make sense, as I don't really understand most of it at the moment! Extra reading to do via hyperlinks.

Rorty believes that objectivity in research cannot be achieved. So, what is truth? How can we tell what good research is?
More Rorty reading to complete

Objectivity implies distance/separation from the object, to understand the world 'as it is'.

Kant believed that there are two worlds: the noumenal world of things that exist, and the phenomenal world, which is mediated through our own senses. There is an unbridgeable gap; we are not separate from the context we research. The 'self' and 'other' are always conjoined.

Reflexivity is used to examine, as best we can, to understand our values and the influence they have on the research process. We can never *fully* do that: where does the inside/outside frontier begin? Also, we're human and always interacting therefore cannot fully identify our values, judgements and prejudices. Who we are is contingent on who we are interacting ; there is no essence of identity, so driving down to truth is pointless. We cannot reach a true good/certainty; Plato believes there is something more real lying behind the reality we know.

The present is inauthentic and we work towards a future which is more authentic. However, this doesn't happen.

The dominant view of research is that there *is* a truth. Intepretivism posits that there is not.

Over recent years, there has been a move towards the use of 'mixed methods' becoming popular, as it involves both qualitative and quantitative research. The suggestion is that it is therefore more valid, authentic and with a degree of validity. However.... quantitative data collection drives forward many policies, to the detriment of many services (would need evidence to support this argument!). Greater credence is given to quantitative research results than qualitative.

Note to self: where do I stand in relation to these deep ontological views?

Rigour: we try to ensure objectivity but we are ultimately doomed to failure...

Thomas Kuhn, in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, talked about paradigms. He suggested that there are normal periods of science, with agreement on sets of beliefs underlying the science process. Occasionally, someone comes along with revolutionary ideas, leading to the displacement of the theory  a paradigm shift.

A paradigm is a conceptual framework. Unlike within science, different frameworks an co-exist in the social sciences, capturing different ideas about the nature of research. There is a 'leakiness' between different paradigms, and often bigger differences within research paradigms than between them (as suggested by Hammersley).

These paradigms both simplify and conceal/obscure - they reveal and conceal.

Definitions and Paradigms

Ontology: to do with the nature of truth, the nature of being. Whether you believe in truth  or not is an ontological question. Do we believe in *a* reality, are is it relativist?

Epistemology: What do we know? Theories of knowledge. There is also standpoint epistemology e.g. feminist viewpoint. Epistemology is also a statement on the nature of being.

Ontology and epistemology are inseparable. It is impossible to have a theory of knowledge without a theory of being.

Methodology: An approach to [research?] It is the underpinning philosophical/conceptual frameworks guiding our research.

See the grid (2/10/15): An adaption by Garrett of Sparkes' (1993) assumptions underlying paradigms.

It looks at three paradigms: post-positivism (PP),  Constructivism/Interpretivism (Int) and Critical Theory (CT).
Post-structuralists would suggest that the grid is nonsensical as they cannot be separated.

Positivism: Auguste Comte followed an empiricist epistemology and believed that you can apply the research rules of the natural sciences to the social world with practical justification leading to social progress. Examples include evidence-based practice, empirical data.

Nowadays we discuss post-positivism (PP) as positivism was discredited, as absolute truth cannot exist. PPs attempt to proximate the truth (BUT... how can we know how near or far we are from the truth?). They believe we can try to minimise our subjectivity but this is ostensibly impossible.

PP Ontology: External-realist - reality exists but can never be fully apprehended. Correspondence theory of truth.

PP epistemology: Modified objectivist//dualist: objectivity remains an ideal but can only be approximated.

PP Methodology: Nomothetic (generalizable)/experimental/manipulative; wants to generalise.

Our writing must use narrative devices to persuade the reader of our understanding of the truth, e.g. detailed field notes, rich data from interviews, to give a strong sense of context through our writing.

INT ontology: relativist: there are multiple mental constructions, socially and experientially based, which are local and specific.

INT epistemology: subjectivist - researcher ad researched are fused into a single entity. Findings are the creation of the process of interaction between the two.

INT methodology: hermeneutic/dialectic/ideographic - individual constructions/understandings are refined through a process of dialogue. This paradigm privileges cases, e.g. ethnography, understanding a culture in depth though a personal lens. Within hermeneutics (e.g. Heidegger and Gadamer) they embrace the frameworks but realise that we cannot know what they are, but they do allow us to challenge our judgements, 'placing prejudices at risk'. This changes us - reflexivity. reflexivity means adaptation of, for example, your interview questions, reacting to the interviewee, asking different questions, moving amongst questions - the interview is a conversation.

Truth is transient, based on social agreement in this paradigm.

CT Ontology: Critical realist/internal idealist

CT epistemology: Subjectivist/interactive

CT methodology: ideographic/participative/transformative - an ambition to transform for those at a social disadvantage, i.e. make a difference. You may collaborate with those you're researching, doing research with a group rather than to a group.


Questions to answer: Where do I sit? I suppose, without knowing very much at all, and by looking at my responses to the initial 'definitions of research' activity, I feel I sit most comfortably within the interpretivist paradigm. Despite my background in science (or maybe because of it), I feel that it doesn't provide the sort of information I feel I want to gain for my research. I feel uncomfortable with the critical theorists viewpoint of active involvement to make a change. We'll see how this develops.

More reading... Sparkes on the Paradigms Debate

Alternative title: Help me, my brain is melting...

This was a big article. I got lucky with Eisner as my first read - it was an easier read and made intuitive sense. This overview of three key research paradigms, however, was not so easy.

This wasn't helped by coming at it piecemeal - 20 minutes here, half an hour in the soft play centre there, and so on.

Much of what I'm going to write (and there's lots because I found it so difficult) is pretty much verbatim from the text, as I don't yet have the knowledge to be able to condense. As I always tell students asking about paraphrasing, if you don't understand the text, you can't effectively paraphrase it. So, this is mostly direct from text.

Sparkes, A. C. (1992). The paradigm debate: An extended review and a celebration of difference. In: A. C. Sparks (ed.). Research in physical education and sport. (pp. 9-60). London, United Kingdom: Falmer.

There has been a revolution in philosophical paradigms, including in Sparkes' specialism (PE), where empirical predominance is being rethought. [Bear in mind that this was written in 1992, so there has probably been a lot more re-thinking since then!]. The purpose of the paper is as a framework to aid understanding of the debate that is taking place. It covers three paradigms, interpretive, critical and positivist.

There is a discussion on the nature of paradigms but effectively that they are a shared conception of problems and the methods shared within them. They can be described as a shared world view, a way of breaking down the complexity of the world. Paradigms are deeply embedded within the researcher's own socialisations, experiences and framework. Herein lies their strength and their weakness. The strength is that they make action possible without thinking about *every* angle of research. Their weakness is that there are hidden, unquestioned assumptions within each paradigm - an awareness of them is needed to ensure an understanding of the unseen frameworks within which the researcher operates. Paradigms act as a theoretical lens through which we experience the world.

To add to what Sparkes says, and to link to Eisner: these frameworks and assumptions within each paradigm don't just affect how we think and act but at a more fundamental level it will act as a barrier as to whether we *see* specific aspects of what we observe. I'm not sure that's clear, but I think I know what I mean there. We are blinkered, so we don't know that we can't see something, so we have no ability to research/understand it, because to us, it's not there!

I suppose it makes me uncomfortable that Sparkes states "the individual must not only learn the content of the field but also a particular way of seeing the world that eventually becomes not only unquestioned but unquestionable." Is this a healthy way of working? Perhaps so, If the alternative is a philosophical dam against which we ultimately can't move because of the inertia of philosophical vacillation.

During the 'socialisation' process into a paradigm the researcher absorbs assumptions on ontology and epistemology. Social scientists need to question whether there is an external 'reality' or one coloured by individual consciousness and experience - ONTOLOGY.

External realists of positivism vs the internal idealists of interpretivism.

The epistemology - how we know what is true or false - differs too. The objectivist view is that knowledge is capable of being transmitted in a tangible form and is 'hard' and 'real'. The subjectivist epistemology believes that the truth/knowledge is subjective and as such subject to interpretation through our individual lenses or the lenses employed when working within a specific paradigm.

There is a third set of assumptions, based on human nature:
Deterministic: people react to their environment and are products of it;
Voluntaristic: people have control over at least some of their environment and exhibit autonomy, "actively creating their environment".

The standpoint of the researcher on these three sets of assumption affects how they gather date:

1. External realist vs internal idealist
2. Objectivist vs subjectivist
3. Deterministic vs voluntaristic.

Sparkes discusses these assumptions to show that all researchers make assumptions relating to ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. These assumptions cluster and are given coherence within the frameworks of particular paradigms. No researcher approaches research as a blank slate - ontological assumptions give rise to epistemological assumptions which have methodological implications for the choices made regarding particular techniques of data collection, interpretation of findings and the ways they are understood and discussed in texts or orally presented.

Essentially, those working within different paradigms view the world in different ways, investigate situations in different ways and report the results of their investigations in different ways. The researchers' basic assumptions concerning ontology (reality), epistemology (truth), the physical world and the social world affect all aspects of research. Confusion is increased through the inaccurate use of words such as methods, research methods, and methodology. Sparkes uses the following definitions:
Methodology: the philosophical underpinning of the investigation
Research strategy: the design and carrying out of the investigation
Research techniques: specific methods to yield data, e.g. questionnaire construction, statistical analysis.
Methods cannot be independent of the philosophical underpinning and similarly the interpretation of results and their recording. "Techniques of data collection do not constitute the uniqueness of a paradigm" - the same data collection method can be use din both a positivist and behavioural way but the meaning put on the findings will differ, as well as the content gathered.

In investigating various paradigms, Sparkes explains that it is important to avoid caricatures. It must be remembered that within each paradigm there is heterogeneity - different traditions within each form of paradigm.

The Positivist Paradigm

This has a  long history, and uses the notions of science as a framework. It is historically important - Sparkes discusses its role within PE and that it offers "almost unquestionable respectability". For example, objective measurement of teaching and learning, the use of standardised data collection instruments. Inter-related assumptions listed by Popkewitz (1984) shape the positivist paradigm:

1. theories are universal and not affected by the values of the researchers;
2. the science is "disinterested" and not affected by the values of the researchers;
3. the social world can be reduced to variables that can be studied independently;
4. concepts can be formalised and defined so as to provide dependent and independent variables to manipulate;
5. use of quantitative analysis to reduce ambiguity.

Ontologically: the social world is ontologically objective and concepts such as intelligence, self esteem exist separate from the individual. The researcher observes nature in such a way as to not affect nature's answers. Sources of bias must be recognised and controlled. Internal and external validity, as well as reliability must be provided by the research techniques.

VALIDITY can be established when the extent to which conclusions represent empirical reality, and also when assessing whether the constructs devised by researchers measure the categories of human experience that occur. "A judgement is 'true' when it corresponds to this external reality and 'false' when it does not - the correspondence theory of truth. Observation (empirical verification) is needed so that we can judge whether a statement is true. To achieve objectivity, positivists follow the 'scientific method'.

The interpretive paradigm

In contrast to the positivist paradigm is the interpretive paradigm, an umbrella term within which sit a whole range of methodologies. We cannot lump them all together as 'qualitative vs quantitative' as some interpretive methodologies are at least partially quantitative. It only cam einto more common usage in the late 1980s, and developed as a reaction against positivism, as it was suggested that studying the social world couldn't be achieved objectively.

The interpretive paradigm adopts an 'internalist idealist' ontology and a subjective epistemology and prefer an IDEOGRAPHIC methodology. For example, facts only exist within the context of a mental framework (construct); i.e. reality is only viewed through a window tinted by values. Knowledge is the consequence of human activity, i.e it is a human construct and can never be agreed as ultimately true. The paradigm takes a position of RELATIVISM - there are multiple realities existing within different individual's minds, and are open to subjective interpretation. The mind of the researcher doesn't "create" the findings, but colours the interpretation of the findings, assigning meaning and intentions makes the social reality.

The paradigm rejects the positivist idea of an independently existing reality that can be found through specific methods. Even 'objective' methods are value-laden and open to interpretation. It takes an EMIC approach. Sparkes discusses authors' views on ethnography, explaining social reality from within the group, as opposed to the positivist view, detachedly looking in.

Interpretive research and the 'researcher as instrument'
Sparkes discusses researchers viewing the role of the researcher within ethnographic studies as being *the* most important research instrument - it is "engagement of the self". Within ethnographic studies, the data that are not gathered, as well as those that are, shape the research - the framework within the researcher will affect the data gathered.

In interpretivism, truth/validity isn't a matter of correspondence, it is a matter of COHERENCE - what is true is what we can agree (within the confines of that time/context) is true. 2Within a coherence theory of truth, a proposition is judged to be true if it COHERES (connects consistently) with other propositions in a scheme or network at a particular time - COHERENCE is a matter of internal relations as opposed to the DEGREE OF CORRESPONDENCE with some external reality.

Popkewitz describes objectivity in this area is the result of inter-subjective consensus through social interaction. He also states that this also applies to the scientific community - knowledge of science is considered valid and truthful only insofar as it reflects the consensus of the scholarly community.

The "truth" of an ethnographic report depends on how well it "rings true" to natives and colleagues within the field. However, interpretation remains an INTERPRETATION of a set of events; credibility is not necessarily is altered by agreement or disagreement by the subjects. The subjects will have their own interpretation of their social world (first order constructs) which often differ from those of the researcher (second order constructs). It is still important for the researcher to check their findings and that certain words were used/events took place. It's also important to discuss interpretations even though there may be disagreements - these, in themselves, can be of use and provide further data for interpretation - REFLEXIVE ELABORATION. Furthermore, there may be disagreements amongst scholars studying the same group. These differences are generally those of emphasis or orientation. "qualitative research cannot be made researcher-proof". Because multiple interpretations can be made even on the same group, there can be 'many truths' available. So, with multiple interpretations possible, which is 'best' or 'most nearly correct'?

There can be multiple truths through multiple interpretations, but we must make sure that we don't lose our critical abilities - not all interpretations stand up to scrutiny. This is true, even though interpretivism is relativistic. There are three main views of relativism (Rorty, 1985):

1. every belief is as good as any other;
2. "true" is an equivocal term, with as many meanings as there are procedures of justification;
3. There is nothing to be said about truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures or justifications which our society uses in areas of inquiry.

Most interpretivists adhere to the third view - judgements of truth are relative to a particular framework, paradigm or point of view. Therefore, not everything goes; researchers within an interpretive paradigm differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' research, according to their own framework.

Some researchers have discussed how constructivist research can best be judged, in this case. e.g. trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, dependability and authenticity. Under these come sub-lists - these checklists help to judge the 'goodness' of constructivist research.

Harris states that at least three levels of interpretation are needed for 'good' qualitative research:

1. Grounded in shared understandings about the culture developed between the researcher and members of the group being examined.
2. Must include the researcher’s insights of the culture that are not well-articulated by the members of the group;
3. Must include theoretical generalisations that go beyond the group culture to link to relevant parts of other research.

Athens discusses here criteria for evaluating qualitative studies.

1. Theoretical import – the contribution towards new theories or refinement of existing theories;
2. Whether the scientific concepts are empirically grounded;
3. “Scientific credibility” – the researcher must make the study credible by providing an account of the research along with a description of the results. An account is a story told by the researcher about how they performed the research in question.

It is important to remember that different researchers using different frameworks and theoretical underpinnings, when observing the same group, may well provide different interpretations using sound interpretive research.

To try to consider which research is ‘stronger’ we are tied by HERMENEUTICS – truth is constructed by the rhetoric of the researchers. “A good explanation makes sense of the behaviour, but to appreciate the good explanation, one must agree on what makes good sense. What makes good sense is a function of ones readings, and these in turn are based on the kind of sense one understands.” ”Truth is what we agree to be true at any one time”.

However, different interpretations can co-exist, providing a richer view of a culture.

The Critical Paradigm

There is no such thing as ‘critical theory’; it’s an umbrella term for a range of different theories. The key commonly shared assumption is EMANCIPATION – enabling people to gain knowledge and power in order to take control of their lives. There is a dismissal of positivism as a means of enforcing the status quo whilst producing theories that are “often trivial and useless”.

Critical theory developed from the work of the Frankfurt School; it is overtly political, highlighting substantive social issues, uncovering the oppression within these issues and, importantly, doing something about it.

With regard to ontology and epistemology, there are two strands running through the critical paradigm:

1. Associated with positivism – a RADICAL STRUCTURALIST strand with an external realist ontology, an objectivist epistemology and a deterministic view of people. It concentrates on STRUCTURAL relationships within a realist social world via analysis of deepseated internal contradictions and the analysis of power relationships.
2. Associated with radical humanism – similar to the interpretive paradigm, it has in internal-idealist ontology, a subjectivist epistemology and a voluntaristic view of people. It is believed that reality is socially constructed, knowledge is context specific and value-laden.

Critical theorists see interpretive paradigm research as having major weaknesses as they do not consider the wider sociohistorical, political and economic movements on the theories.

One major concern within education research (PE) is that interpretivist research has not taken into account the way individual and group behaviour is influenced by the way society is organised. Findings are determined within a social and organisational context permeated by the inequal power relationships (cf Foucault?) Anderson (1989a) suggests these following critical research questions regarding the nature of knowledge in organisations:

1. What counts as knowledge?
2. How is what counts as knowledge organised?
3. How is what counts as knowledge transmitted?
4. How is access to what counts as knowledge determined?
5. What are the processes of control?
6. What ideological appeals justify the system?

The central emphasis is the way human consciousness is shaped and controlled by existing social arrangements to serve some groups in society at the expense of others (INEQUAL POWER RELATIONSHIPS). Relational analysis is often used to analyse these relationships – viewing the historical, social and cultural constructs surrounding the practice under study.

Griffin (1990): “

1. Society is made of groups with power and privilege and those without;
2. Social institutions in a society perpetuate the status quo of this power imbalance;
3. The powerful and privileged have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo (their power and privilege);
4. The powerless and disadvantaged have a vested interest in social change;
5. The competing interests result in conflict and tension, often below the surface of apparent harmony and consensus;
6. The critical perspective brings to light the contradictions between apparent harmony/consensus and conflict/tension, in order to problematize the status quo;
7. A critical perspective is concerned with ‘why/why not’ questions – whose interest is served? The intention is to change the world, not describe it;
8. A critical perspective believes in the importance of changing individual and group consciousness in creating social change.

Critical researchers may use data collection techniques from the interpretive paradigm, but go further, to investigate the inequal power relationships – critical ethnography. This can be done in three ways:

1. Consider the subject group in a wider social context. This is weak as the critical analysis can be omitted if it just analyses functional relationships between the subject group and the wider social milieu.
2. Critical ethnography through focussing on the wider structural relations and examining how social processes in the subject group are mediated by structural relations.
3. The strongest form is to incorporate ethnography into a DIALECTICAL analysis – the understandings from the ethnographic study are analysed in relation to the social structures that shape the lives of people.

This final method begins with structural relationships and then undertakes an ethnographic study in order to facilitate a structural analysis.

Where critical ethnographers differ is that they claim that the subject’s perceptions of social reality are permeated with meanings that sustain powerlessness. The conscious models used by people exist to ensure the continuance of the social phenomena.

Researchers investigate the process by which certain meaning structures become accepted as the status quo. They then consider whose interest the status quo benefits. They actively engage with the social group to elicit transformation through understanding and action. They seek to change the world. Examples of the critical paradigm are: feminist research and neo-Marxist critical ethnography.

For transformation to occur, research must be done with the full participation of the people under study. The researcher provides those researched with insights that might act as the basis for change. The researched are participants in the process not subjects to be studied.

Validity has a very different definition in critical research. It needs to be understood as being relevant to the practitioner’s situation, and potentially transformative, to be valid. “Validity in critical research relates not only to the trustworthiness and credibility of the interpretation but also how effective the research process has been in empowering the participants and enabling them to create change.” This is very different to the positivist view of researcher neutrality. Therefore, validity’s definition changes significantly depending on the paradigm within which you work.

Comment by Sparkes

Validity derives its meaning from different sets of assumptions, theories and purposes within the different paradigms. Each paradigm needs to be understood in its own terms. It is important to recognise that each paradigm can help develop our understanding of the social world, and also that new paradigms will be developed. You must judge research carried out within a paradigm according to that paradigm’s own criteria and assumptions. It is important to be aware of the assumptions within each paradigm, even if you do not work within it.

What does all this mean to me?

Not a lot at the moment…

Firstly, this paper was written a long time ago, now. I’m sure the arguments have moved on and that there are new paradigms that have taken over as the most in touch with the ‘zeitgeist’.
Secondly – the long words… my brain hurts…
Thirdly, whilst I get the gist of critical research, I doubt I could get involved in it. The thought of being transformative in the research seems such a huge jump, especially with my background in empiricism and the ‘detached scientist’ viewpoint. Interpretivism doesn’t seem quite such a huge leap, though. We’ll see. Lots more to read, and I need to go back to look at some of the terms I don’t understand.