Rawolle, S. & Lingard, B. (2013). Bourdieu and educational research: Thinking tools, relational thinking, beyond epistemological innocence.

Bourdieu is well-used in educational research (some may argue over-used) but what I have read resonates with my own thoughts on academic skills development and transition to/within HE. I’m therefore starting to explore his conceptual tools in relation to educational research. I decided not to jump in at the deep end and read his own work straight away – I’d rather get my head around his ideas first, as I believe his writing is somewhat hard-going.

Rawolle, S. & Lingard, B. (2013). Bourdieu and educational research: Thinking tools, relational thinking, beyond epistemological innocence. In M. Murphy (Ed.), Social theory and education research: Understanding Foucault, Habermas, Bourdieu and Derrida. (pp. 117-137). Abingdon, United Kingdom: Routledge.

The authors of this chapter give an overview of Bourdieu’s background and the influence of his ideas on social theory. Rather that purely exploring theory, Bourdieu emphasised the link between theory and practice. His great interest is in the “relational workings of the social arrangement” (p. 117) – this links to his work on fields and the relations within and between different fields.

The authors suggest that Bourdieu’s work is universal in its application – both globally and within a range of fields. They posit that Bourdieu’s frequent return to previous work is indicative of his reflexivity.

Bourdieu also developed what are called “thinking tools” (p. 119) which he developed and which continued to be developed throughout his practice.

The authors indicate that the reception of Bourdieu’s theories as they relate to education varies internationally. This is in part due to differences in availability of translated works. Variation may also be due to whether key academics within individual countries engaged with Bourdieu’s theories.

Wacquant (1989) describes Bourdieu as developing a set of “thinking tools” which, although appropriated from a range of disciplines, were developed within Bourdieu’s studies. These tools can be considered a framework to use in the examination of a range of applications.

Practice and habitus: These two thinking tools developed in relation to anthropological research Bourdieu undertook in Algeria. He did not alter his approach when researching in the differing culture of France. Explore this issue? Bourdieu did not provide a definition of practice but viewed it as the essence of social life, an area to be explored. Need to find a clearer definition of practice, if one exists!

The development of Bourdieu’s thoughts on fields led, perhaps inevitably, to consideration of a general theory of fields. This could aid understanding of the relationality between fields, and areas of convergence, overlap and divergence. This is discussed in Bourdieu (1993) – Sociology in Question. (Look at Maton, 2005).

As well as providing thinking tools, Bourdieu also gives guidance on how a research habitus can be developed for using his theories in education.

Methodological approaches and researcher stances: beyond epistemological innocence

Bourdieu suggests that reflexive locating of the researcher within the relevant field(s) is vital for effective social research. This is a really interesting point to explore further. Does this link with reflexivity such as that espoused by Heidegger? What does this mean for my research – is it more effective because of my position and background within the area being researched?

Read “A Bourdieusian approach to methodology in Grenfell (2008).

The final point the authors explore with regard to Bourdieu is his concept of the “collective intellectual” (p. 132). He saw the need for academics to work within the political field not only the academic field, to overcome the dichotomy between academia and political commitment. This is closer to the French intellectualism tradition.

The authors’ key points from the conclusion:

-          Generative thinking tools: practice, habitus capital, field

-          Reproduction in education

-          Rejecting epistemological innocence

-          Researcher reflexivity – researcher habitus

-          Research with commitment and being political.

 What use is this for me?

An interesting read when I know little of Bourdieu. It’s given me some good further reading and an overview of the conceptual tools I would want to use.

Weekend 3: Handwritten notes

Theorising data

The quality of theorising data is key in doctoral research. See Dean’s two papers to explore what it means to theorise something, for example application of Foucault’s ideas to policies surrounding safeguarding in sports coaching.

Rorty stats that “All we have is interpretation”, so all we have is differing interpretations of experiences. Should we strive towards truth, in its absence.

Jean-Luc Nancy explored the concept of “being with”: we cannot exist as individuals, as we are social beings. Our identity emerges through our interaction with others. Identity captures our engaging with others within particular contexts.

Judith Butler discussed performativity – we perform differently in different contexts. There is no ‘essence’ of ourselves.

We bring meaning to data – it is a process of construction of meaning. The data does not exist without the meaning and the significance we put on it. Context is of key significance, and helps us to produce meaning. There is construction of the context between interviewer and interviewee.
This links to reflexivity – the narrative of who we are, our aspects of self and our connections to the research.

There was a brief discussion over research data anomalies – it is of great interest to explore anomalous data rather than to try and ignore it. Why is it there? What does it mean in relation to the agreeing data?

 Key issues arising from the evening activity

Truth is plural – there are multiple truths.
Who we are and how we see influences our perception of truth. Our interpretations cause us to see the world differently. We privilege some things and deselect others – perception is very individual.
We need to relate this to our ontological and epistemological position.
Ontology is existence.

If truth is a plural concept, the ontological status is relativism. Interpretation is critical. We are not dealing with the ontological realism of a singularity of truth but a plurality of multiple truths.

BUT – does this mean ‘anything goes’? – The tutor asked us to question whether this was actually important. We always have to live with uncertainty, so why not with uncertainty over research. However, there are certain truths which hold sway at different times – these are not foundational but are based on community debate as to what is temporarily/provisionally held to count as ‘truth’. However, within this community, there may be different perspectives, with tensions between them. Therefore, there is no total agreement on interpretation/truth.

Other key issues:

Meaning does not reside in the data itself – meaning is brought into being and partly constructed through our interaction with it. The sense we make of data is affected by what we bring (culturally, socially, historically located) i.e. CONTEXT.

Discovery as a metaphor for research is inaccurate. It is more a construction and creation than a discovery. For example phenomenological hermeneutics acknowledge the importance of ‘self’ in the construction and telling of the ‘other’ – self and other are conjoined.
We cannot bracket off our subjectivity but we must embrace it – this is who I am and this affects how I understand and interpret.

Heidegger suggests that we are already located in presuppositions – ie our ‘being in the world’ – our social, historical, cultural context.

Nancy: ‘being with’ locates you – who you are with affects who you are.

Michael Polanyi discussed ‘tacit knowledge’: knowledge we cannot explicitly explain but that we have. We cannot render a feeling fully explicit (e.g. my choice of IPA?)

Other issues raised:

The criteria with which our research is judged: where I position myself in relation to onto-epistemic issues. I  need to articulate how I want to be judged – I will need to discuss the criteria for judgement.

Conventional criteria do not apply in qualitative contexts. Remodelling of the criteria to include, for example, authenticity and verisimilitude are still ‘fudging’ the issue – still appealing to accuracy but by different names. We only have the power of rhetoric to take the reader into your word – you need resonance with the reader, and this will not always happen.

What you write will only ever ring true for some people. Validity shifts from accuracy to a plain that recognises the importance of resonance and experience – connection to the information. This is not a simplistic correspondence, such as ‘does the report accurately represent reality?’

This shifts the test of validity – the truth of the account partly resides in the standpoint of the reader. Truth isn’t solely controlled by the authorial account.

Dean is going to send out a paper on the flexibility of validity.

Presentation (PowerPoint) on Heidegerrian Phenomenology

Slide 1:

Ò  … utilises a hermeneutic approach that is fundamentally ontological

Ò  This informs us of ‘how’ a ‘what’ is to be treated, and is primarily methodological

Ò  ‘what does this data mean’ becomes ‘how is this data meaningful’?

The activity we took part in was fundamentally ontological – we drew on our own being. The questions move from ‘what does this mean’ to ‘how is this meaningful?’ – our interaction and construction bring meaning into being.

 Slide 2:

Ò  The latter cannot be answered except in relation to Dasein (da – here; sein – being)

Ò  Thus, descriptions are impossible without interpretation

Ò  ‘the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation’ (Heidegger 1962: 61).

Descriptions are impossible without interpretation and construction of meaning. Our identities (plural rather than singular) are exposed differently depending on our ‘being with’. Identities are contextually located.

Slide 3:

Ò  Being and becoming are hermeneutic:

Ò   ‘the phenomenology of Dasein is a hermeneutic in the primordial significance of the word, where it designates this business of interpreting’ (Heidegger 1962: 62).

Becoming: Being isn’t fixed – it is dynamic. We ‘become’ according to those around us – it is relational.

Slide 4:

Ò  Interpretation is ‘grounded in something we have in advance fore-having … we see in advance fore-sight … and something we grasp in advance fore-conception (Heidegger 1962: 193)

Ò  The implication for research is that data is analysed through these fore-structures

Ò  Such structures suggest that understanding is not ground in data but in what people have in advance – the always already Being

‘Fore-having’ – we have ‘fore-conception’ – we analyse data through these fore-structures. The understanding is not grounded in data but in being and fore-having – i.e. we have preconceptions and ‘baggage’.

Therefore, research is always already theoretically over-determined – we are always already theoretical as we are always already schooled in some sense, e.g. through family, community, culture, tradition. We cannot bracket that.

 Slide 5:

Ò  Key points

Ò  The object and subject of the world are inseparable

Ò   Dasein is the Being that is peculiar to humans who must paradoxically live in relationships while simultaneously being ultimately alone with oneself

Ò  To understand the Other, a person’s behaviour or expressions, one has to study that person in context

It is impossible to know when what is outside of ourselves starts and what is internal begins in regard to interpretation. Interpretation is an interaction but we cannot pin it down. We cannot recognise the extent of our self. Ethically, this is very powerful as we as the author have to consider equity, responsibility, whose voices we choose to privilege and whose we silence.

Reflexivity involves engaging critically with what we recognise as our position and subjectivity, to interrogate but we will always fail as we cannot fully recognise the extent of our influence.

Reflexivity: positioning our professional values that are shared with the contextualisation of the work.

Grounded Theory

Slide 1:

… addresses the ‘important enterprise of how the discovery of theory from data - systematically obtained and analyzed in social research - can be furthered’

Glaser, B.G. and Strauss, A.L (1967) The Discovery of Grounded Theory: strategies for qualitative research, London:  Aldine, p.1).

Glaser & Strauss (1967): The discovery of theory from data

Theories from the study are based on data – theories emerged from the data, i.e. the authors weren’t bringing anything to it – the data drove the themes. This assumes that we enter the context of research without baggage, in order to see what’s occurring. It assumes that no literature has been read beforehand, there are no lenses to see through, allowing data to drive theory production – data “springs forth”. BUT there is no acknowledgement of a lens.

 

Slide 2:

—  … relies upon ‘a general method of comparative analysis’ (p.1)

‘we would all agree that in social research generating theory goes hand in hand with verifying it’ (p.2).

This is problematic as it suggests that there is logical induction. Karl Popper critiques logical induction through the black swan story. There is no way of verifying a theory based on induction. There is always the possibility of an anomaly in the next observation. We can only ever falsify a theory rather than verify it.

How can we ever know how close we are to ‘the truth’? Verify against what? We cannot know how near or far we are from a ‘truth’.

The categories we develop in our minds are influenced by our framing of the context. We cannot verify it – if something (a theme) keeps repeating itself, it is because we keep seeing it. We may not see other things.

There is a tension in grounded theory – it wants us to be open-minded, inductive and generative BUT it is also seeking to verify – that is, it is narrowing, reductive and deductive.

What are the external references allowing us to verify something, other than keeping seeing the same thing? – affirmation of the self.

 

Slide 3:

—  According to Glaser and Strauss – grounded theory appeals to the ‘interrelated jobs of theory in sociology:

                (1) to enable prediction and explanation of         behaviour; (2) to be useful in theoretical advance in                 sociology; (3) to be usable in practical applications –        prediction and explanation should be able to give                 the practitioner understanding and some control of        situation; (4) to provide a perspective on behaviour                 – a stance to be taken towards data; and (5) to guide and provide a style for research on particular         areas of behaviour’ (p.3).

“Prediction and explanation” come up several times in these assumptions – these align with the key concepts of positivism. This holds to the view that there is a ‘real view’ of the world – theory is developed on that basis and we can remove our subjectivity, so in reality, GT is positivist.

Slide 5:

—  Located where? … possibly conceptual tensions?

—  Used in education research, nursing and organisational studies, but also elsewhere

—  Has much in common with ethnography, case study, action research

—  Rejection of a priori theorising – emergent theory

—  Implicit verification-ism

—  Not steeped in literature

—  Inductive, constructivist approach to data collection

—  Imperative to reach saturation, but why?

—  Interaction between data collection, analysis and theory building – ‘theory must “fit” the situation being researched’ (p.3)

Features of grounded theory: It is unsure where it sits – there are conceptual tensions. It rejects a priori theorising.

Slide 6:

—  ‘Categories must be readily (not forcibly) applicable to and indicated by the data under study; by “work” we mean that they must be meaningfully relevant to and be able to explain the behaviour under study

—  … categories are discovered by examination of the data’ (p. 3).

—  ‘the adequacy of a theory for sociology today cannot be divorced from the process by which it is generated’ (p.5).

To generate theory…

GT suggests that the meaning/theme is already there, and is not imposed by the self. But how can this be separate? We interact (with our baggage) – they suggest that this doesn’t happen and that the categories are there *before* our interaction.

Slide 8:

—  ‘The biographies of scientists are replete with stories of occasional flashes of insight, of seminal ideas, garnered from sources outside the data. But the generation of theory from such insights must then be brought into relation to the data, or there is great danger that theory and the empirical world will mismatch’ (p.6)

What is the ‘empirical world’ – we only know the phenomenal one through our own senses and constructions.

NOTE: The tutor did mention the work of CHarmaz with regard to grounded theory, but suggested that her developments took it away from grounded theory and it was closer to phenomenology.

Reflections on learning: widening capability and the student experience

This paper is obliquely linked to my interests but does have some useful information and links. It discusses some theories which may be of relevance in my analysis stages. The social context at the beginning is also useful to help me understand the greater picture. I was drawn in by the title, with 'widening capability' - I initially believed this was to do with widening participation. The link is certainly there, exploring methods of assessment which acknowledge the life experiences of those students from a non-traditional background, but it is more to do with developing skills through this acknowledgement.

Summary: Useful background, some further reading to explore.

Garratt, D. (2011). Reflections on learning:  widening capability and the student experience. Cambridge Journal of Education, 41(2), 211-225. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0305764X.2011.572866

Social Context

There has been rapid and unprecedented expansion of HE in the UK (David, 2010) with an increase in students from non-traditional backgrounds entering HE. Garratt draws attention to the theme of increasing diversity and looks at the implications for learning and teaching, to produce a more socially just pedagogy.

Crozier et al. (2008) suggest that the discourse of WP only involves the 'desire to participate' rather than affecting change in the 'ability to participate' once the students have entered HE. Walker (2008) invokes the Equalities and Human Rights Commission (2007) who believe that within the UK, HE is not fully promoting equality.

Garratt's research question is: "How can HE programmes widen 'capability' by encouraging student reflection on learning and personal knowledge and further recognise the outcomes in order to develop a more inclusive pedagogy, integrating formal and informal learning?"

Methodology and data sources

Garratt identifies the participants, states that it is a qualitative account, with vignettes taken from student learning logs. The study is a post-hoc rationalisation (Hockings et al, 2010). Garratt goes over the ethics process and suggests that the study was done as it was for heuristic reasons. For my own info: heuristic: method not guaranteed to be optimal but sufficient for the immediate goals. Garratt used a hermeneutic approach, moving between theory and data, to find "warrantable understandings" (Ivanic et al., 2007) - illuminating and capable of inference, rather than seeking 'truth'.

Learning log - discussion of the student assessment

Theoretical framework

Sen (1992, 1999) discusses notions of equality in learning, closely linked with the concept of 'capabilities'. Capabilities are the opportunities given to individuals to enable them to realise their potential.

The space between an individual's 'internal capabilities' (Nussbaum, 2000) and 'functionings' (realisation of measurable outcomes) is mediated by the external environment. Bourdieu's  concepts of 'habitus' and 'cultural capital' help demonstrate how students have varying levels of accessibility to particular forms of high status knowledge, based on prior learning experiences and dispositions (Crozier et al, 2010). Crozier et al (2010) suggest that there is a disjunction between the habitus of students from non-traditional backgrounds and the unfamiliar field of experience at university.

Garratt uses Critical Race Theory to analyse the vignettes, using rich data to explore the 'warrantable understandings' drawn from the work.

Widening capability in student experience

Students telling their own stories in accordance with freedoms they have reason to value, the learning task provided opportunity to widen 'capability' and allow students to participate more confidently in their learning.

Hockings et al (2010) "students value teaching that recognises their individual academic and social identities and that addresses their particular learning needs".

Bates (2007): productive pedagogies that seek to develop a capability approach and further the course of social justice in education often usefully possess the following characteristics:...... Intellectual quality - development of higher order thinking.....

Further reading:

Bates (2007) Developing capabilities and the management of trust. In Walker & Unterhalter (eds) Amartya Sen's capability approach and social justice in education.

Crozier, Reay, Clayton, Colliander, Grinstead (2008) Different strokes for different folks: diverse students in diverse institutions - experiences of higher education

Crozier, Reay, & Clayton (2010) The socio-cultural and learning experiences of working-class students in higher education. In David (below).

David M. (Ed.) (2010) Improving learning by widening participation in higher education

Hockings, Cooke & Bowl (2010) Learning and teaching in two universities within the context of increasing student diversity: Complexity, contradictions and challenges. In David's book above

Ivanic, Edwards, Satchwell and Smith (2007).  Possibilities for pedagogy in further education: harnessing the abundance of literacy.

Nussbaum (2000) Women and human development: the capabilities approach

Sen (1992) Inequality re-examined

Sen (1999) Development as freedom

Walker (2008) Widening participation, widening capability

More IPA - still no idea why I'm keen

I've read a little more about the 'nitty gritty' of IPA, as well as some more background on its history and theory. Daunting, but still I haven't come across a reason why I shouldn't pursue this path. My main concern, I suppose, is that a lot of the literature relates to its use in psychology/health psychology rather than in education. If you search, there is a range of material out these using it in education, albeit relatively recent. I've not got a real idea on the quality of the material either.

Incidentally, while I'm making some notes about assignment 1 (and potential dissertation thoughts), I've come across some reference to Tinto's student retention/departure models, which merit further investigation. (Also, Austin's theory on student involvement - not looked into this at all at the moment). These could be of use, depending on what my research finds. I need to keep them in mind. However, I'm not sure, if I use IPA, whether I should be 'free' of theories until after I have done my first lot of analysis - I may potentially organise my questions to support the theories I'm considering aligning my thoughts to.

Anyway, enough navel-gazing. My most recent reading (usual caveats apply - I'll need to paraphrase before use):

Larkin, M., Watts, S., & Clifton, E. (2006). Giving voice and making sense in Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis. Qualitative Research in Psychology, 3, 102-120.

Abstract

IPA involves the phenomenological requirement to understand and give voice to the concerns of participants. The interpretative requirement to contextualise and 'make sense' of the claims and concerns. The paper looks to explore the relationship between the phenomenological and interpretative aspects of IPA. It covers the epistemological range of IPAs interpretative focus and its relationship to the more descriptive features of phenomenological analysis. Drawing upon concepts from Heideggerian phenomenology the paper situates its conclusions within a contextualist position.

Introduction: IPA

There is a belief that IPA is 'simply descriptive'. However, it is only seen as this as it is a flexible, accessible and applicable tool. This is not to say that it is without vigour. To be done correctly the novice researcher must be aware that its inherent flexibility may make other,  more prescriptive, methods 'safer'. The authors believe that IPA is a powerful method when carried out correctly.

The idea that IPA is 'simple' may stem from Conrad's use of the words "insider's perspective" and is invariably used to describe others' work with IPA. To be able to gain an "insider's perspective" requires thought. Some IPA research, particularly in health psychology, has avoided interpretation of data and the formation of concepts. This oversimplification can make IPA seem superficial.

IPA research is ideographic - it focuses on the individual. That is not to say that findings from IPA studies cannot be applied more widely, but that this wider application is not very generalizable (??? - my own thoughts - need to clarify and then support!)

IPA studies, methodologically, produce an intensive and detailed analysis of a relatively small number of participants. A range of methods can be used to gather data, including semi-structured interviews. Findings are reported thematically. The process is flexible and similar to other qualitative methods.

There is a phenomenological emphasis on the lived experience of the participants. The IPA researcher must seek to understand the world of the participant and to describe it. However, our experience of the participant's world can only ever be partial - the account is constructed by both participant and researcher. Nevertheless, the researcher's aim is to reproduce a view as close as possible to that of the participant. The second stage (double hermeneutics) is to perform an interpretative analysis. Here, the researcher takes into account the wider social, cultural and theoretical context when revisiting the description. The interpretation "aims to provide a critical and conceptual commentary upon the participants' personal 'sense-making' activities'" (p. 104). The researchers can consider 'what it means for the participant to have made these claims and expressed themselves within this situation. within this, the researcher may draw upon existing theoretical constructs'. So here, I've answered my question about whether/when to draw on existing theory such as Tinto, Bourdieu (if they are relevant!).

The paper expands on the phenomenological and interpretative aspects of IPA. The background is drawn from Heidegger and hermeneutics. There follows a discussion on the role of IPA in qualitative psychology.

Husserl, Heidegger and phenomenology as the study of persons-in-context

I'm going to have to review other papers on Husserl vs Heidegger, as I don't really understand this. Husserl made human consciousness central to his analyses. He also believed in the role of bracketing.
Heidegger was concerned that a person is always a 'person-in-context': "We are a fundamental part of a meaningful world and the meaningful world is a fundamental part of us". We can only be understood as a function of our involvement within the world and the world can only be understood as a function of our interactions with it.

Heidegger rejects Cartesian dualism of separate subject and object. He develops the concept of 'Dasein' ('there being'/'being there') - by nature we are 'there', i.e. somewhere, always located within a specific context.

Ontological and epistemological bases for investigating the person-in-context

It is not possible to remove ourselves, our thoughts, our meaning systems, from the world 2to find out an objective truth". However, this is not to say that we  live within a relativistic kedgeree of thought. "What is real is not dependent upon us, but questions about the nature of their reality can only occur because we ask the question". "Things" cannot be revealed unless they are brought meaningfully into the context of human life. Any discoveries we make are just a function of the relationship between researcher and subject. The 'reality' which emerges from the work depends upon how it is constructed by the researcher.

To gain answers of value, we need to reflexively consider the most appropriate questions to ask. A key concept of IPA is using 'sensitivity and responsiveness' to provide useful outcomes. Sensitivity and responsiveness are key to the phenomenological context of this method/stance. This allows the participant to show themselves as themselves and reveal any subject matter on their own terms.

The paper discusses the "empathetic" treatment of the subject, but consider this against the paper on hermeneutic listening - an inappropriate word?

IPA and persons-in-context

IPA is interested in how a particular person experiences and understands the idea of interest. Our interest is in their perception of the subject rather than the subject itself. This is a really important idea to remember. This is what makes it such an interesting method/stance. We know that we can't get to the truth, so we seek a truth, as seen by the participant. We need to consider their truth in light of historical/social etc contexts - the interpretative part of IPA. "An account can be used to reveal something about a person, but only that person's current positioning in relation to the world of objects which have come to constitute the subject in their experience, culture and locale". The analyst must therefore focus on the person-in-context (a particular person in a particular context) and that person's relatedness to the 'phenomena at hand' is the topic we are interested in. "That is, we are interested in how they understand and make sense of their experiences in terms of their relatedness to, and their engagement with, those phenomena."

An account produced by a participant can be used thematically to reveal something real about the object we are studying. "In choosing IPA for a research project, we commit ourselves to exploring, describing, interpreting, and situating the means by which our participants make sense of their experiences" (p. 110). This is contextualism (Madill et al., 2000).

Giving voice: The 'phenomenological goal' demonstrated

Heideggerian phenomenology requires us to identify, describe and understand the 'objects of concern' in the participant's world and the 'experiential claims' made by the participant. These are the key feature of the first order, descriptive, coding in IPA. The authors give an example - Nigel. They study him in order to capture something "of what is important" to him in this context and with this topic at hand. The key element for Nigel is money - it permeates his words.

Making sense - the 'interpretative repertoire' revisited

IPA wants to go further than description; not least because it is hard to identify where description ends and interpretation begins. IPA goes beyond description as it focuses on sense-making activities and our 'involvement in the world'. Interpreting what it means for the participant to have such concerns, within their specific context.

Hermeneutics does not subscribe to a correspondence theory of truth. It assumes that any interpretation involving a hermeneutic circle in which the interpreter's perspective and understanding initially shape their interpretation, but that interpretation, as it reacts with the phenomena of interest, is open to revision and elaboration as the perspective and understanding of the interpreter, including their biases and blind spots, are revealed and evaluated.

P. 114: IPA has been developed to allow the researcher to produce a theoretical framework based upon, but capable of exceeding, the participant's own terminology and conceptualisations. The approach seeks to generate an 'insider's perspective' but no single theoretical assumption about how that perspective may be interpreted.

A range of analytical strategies can be used during interpretation. Anything used needs: carefully formulated research questions and subsequent analysis; a willingness to reflect on the process of data collection and analysis; a contextualised account.

Summary

IPA has developed as a set of core ideas (idiographic, phenomenological, interpretative analysis, with first person accounts as data, etc.). Some areas are flexible, e.g. epistemology procedure. It combines rich description of a phenomenological 'core' (aiming to capture something of the 'person-in-context'), with more speculative development of an interpretative account - the meaning of the claims and concerns.

Bringing together the week 1 reading

Even before the weekend, I'd started to get an understanding of why we'd been given the articles to read. They all revolve around the idea of validity. How do we know that research is good research? Do we actually need to know this?

Different paradigms raise different interpretations of what is meant by 'good' research and how this can be determined.

At the weekend session, each group was given a paper to discuss. we ended up with Lather, which was rather mind-blowing.

What was said about each author?

Hammersley: A post-empiricist, believing in 'subtle realism'. He believes that rigorously conducted method is a guarantor of truth, from a scientific viewpoint. "Validity is a synonym of truth and method its guarantor" (p. 69). This is the correspondence theory of truth. For Hammersley, research is science.

Smith: Outlines three perspectives that challenge the dominant view. He suggests that all judgements are based on practical, ethical issues - we are all post-foundationalists. We make judgements based on social interaction. The criteria aren't fixed in advance (compare to Hammersley). Think about how you judge art. You engage with the piece - you ask questions of it, it asks questions of you - a "fusion of horizons" - dialectical criteria.

Collins: Structures in society perpetuate the dominant truth. Concrete experience is required.

Lather: Not quite 'anything goes' but suggests a more open view of what can be used to consider validity. Be aware that even in alternative views of validity, the shadowy hand of positivism remains.
 Use of reflexive poetry, reflecting on participants' feedback. All needs t be considered. And maybe all's been done before...Erasmus Darwin  - scientific prose in poetry! It seems that, although Lather suggested that some of her ideas were undoubtedly ephemeral; nevertheless, some seem to have ensured over 20 years... http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/08893675.2015.1051293

Week 1 reading - heaven knows, (almost) anything goes!

Lather, P. (1993). Fertile obsession: Validity after poststructuralism. The Sociological Quarterly, 34(4), 673-693.

This is the final piece we were asked to read before the first EdD weekend. This was, quite possibly, the most difficult work to read. I've read and re-read it and still can barely get my head around the concepts. There may be some interpretations of her work that make it clearer to a beginner in this area - I'll have to have a look. Usual caveats apply with this overview of the article - there's a lot of direct material and little interpretation. I will need to go back to the original article if I want to use anything at a later date :-/

(Note: maybe have a read through this: https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=Nf_FBQAAQBAJ&pg=PT64&lpg=PT64&dq=what+is+%22antifoundational+discourse+theory%22&source=bl&ots=TOjElHemfF&sig=JXGS-k2qOQECK6kQwxJTIVqNk9Q&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CC8Q6AEwA2oVChMI6Mab1v7IyAIVg4UaCh2sFgZn#v=onepage&q=what%20is%20%22antifoundational%20discourse%20theory%22&f=false)

Lather suggests that, at the time of the article, everything is up for discussion, to develop a new way of thinking or rather new ways. She defines validity as "the conditions of the legitimisation of knowledge in contemporary postpositivism" (p. 673).  "Rethinking validity in light of antifoundational discourse theory". She wants to continue to use the word "validity" (with all its associated baggage) but to use it in a more subversive way.

Lather is a poststructuralist feminist and suggests that out of the current void in terms of validity will come innovative ways of imagining it, powered by practice. She muses on the development of validity criteria which are sensitive to context. She suggests that even within the realms of postpositivism, the positivist code still maintains its grip. Think differently is her watchword!

The masks of methodology

Lather suggests we need to see "...what frames out seeing." (p.675). A range of methods have been used to try to resolve the issue of validity, such as member checks, peer review and triangulation, but ultimately these raise more questions than answers. "...to not revert to the dominant, foundational formulaic and readily available codes of validity requires the invention counter discourses/practices of legitimisation" (p. 676).

Transgressive validity

"What do you do with validity once you've met poststructuralism?" Lather provides four "framings" of validity that take antifoundational discourse theory into account.

Counter-practices of authority

Lather introduces a "dispersed validity" (p. 677) suggesting alternative ways of considering validity. She fights against the ideas of "policing sociological sciences" and the development of another "regime of truth". She suggests that her ideas are ephemeral, to open us up to possibilities.

Frame 1: Validity as simulacra/ironic validity
Baudrillard suggests that we have "shifted from a culture of representations to one of simulacra. Neither original nor copy". Ironic validity acknowledges that text will always fail to represent what it points towards but can never reach. Her example (Agee & Evans, 1988) looks at the struggle of an "I" to become an "eye" that both inscribes and interrupt normalising power/knowledge.

Frame 2: Lyotardian paralogy/neopragmatic validity
Legitimising research through 'paralogy' does away with the "Habermasian drive for consensus". Having briefly read about this, my understanding is that Habermas saw discussion as ultimately leading to consensus. However, Lyotard, whilst acknowledging that consensus was one stage of discussion, but ultimately it should lead to 'paralogy' - the development of ideas through conversation which consequently leads to an unending development of new ideas. Lather uses Woodbrooks' (1991) study of African-American women in leadership positions in HE. Woodbrooks used two standard methods of validity in qualitative research - member checks and peer debriefing. After reflecting on the feedback from the participants, she amended her work and sent a second draft to the participants. What resulted was the juxtaposition of the voice of the white female researcher with those of African-American female participants. She held her own frame/lens up for scrutiny and her privilege as a middle-class white female was identified. She had missed out on key aspects of the African-American female experience.

Frame 3: Derridean rigour/rhizomatic validity
Deleuze and Guattari (1983) suggest that the tree is a modernist model of knowledge, but the rhizome as the model for post-modernist knowledge. Arbitrary branching systems of knowledge - networks.

Frame 4: Voluptuous validity/Situated validity
Lather suggests that authority "comes from engagement and self-reflexivity, not distanced 'objectivity'". She discusses Richardson's (1992) essay on a study conducted on unmarried mothers. She writes sociological research as poetry - a "disruptive excess".

Lather suggests that her offerings are given as "more problem than solution" (p. 683). Within the gap offered from the death of positivism lies potential.

My thoughts

I suppose, from a gardening viewpoint, if you pull up a well-established plant which is no longer of use or performing as it should, it opens up clear ground. On the clear ground, seeds can germinate and grow. Not all will reach maturity but in the mean time they are valid competitors which have the potential to grow to maturity.

I can't imagine using these methods of validating research at the moment, but maybe this is because they are so distant from my comfort zone. Of greatest interest out of the four is that of Lyotardian paralogy. It makes sense that conversation should not need to stop at consensus but continue, to see where it does lead.

Actions based on this reading:

• Maybe read about Lyotard some more

 

Weekend 1 reading: Smith and the problem of criteria

Smith, J. K. (1993). The problem of criteria. In: J. K. Smith (ed.). After the demise of empiricism. The problem of judging social and educational enquiry. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

This is another of the weekend 1 readings. Smith is an interpretivist. Again, as I don't really yet understand the topic, a lot of this is verbatim and will need to be paraphrased or quoted if I use it in work.

PEs, CTs and interpretivists can all agree:

• There's no definitive way to distinguish knowledge from opinion or from false claims;
• There's no definitive way to sift good research from bad.

All three paradigms agree that the empirical theory of knowledge is undermined by the fact that theory-free observation is impossible, and so on.

The end of the common ground

However, as the three theories have developed, so have major differences in their positions. The differences lie in the depth to which the PE ideas of theory-free knowledge, abandonment of direct realism and collapse of fact-value and subject-object distinctions are taken.

PEs: To develop a "modified" version of empiricism. They are unwilling to abandon completely the concepts of truth and objectivity as ideals. They suggest that, without these ideals, it is impossible to determine knowledge from opinion and good research from bad. They view the task as to modify empiricism rather than abandon it.

PEs have sought to develop the philosophical doctrine of realism, from 'naïve/direct' to 'sophisticated/indirect' realism. They also argue for the importance of certain values key to the scientific process, e.g. being guided by the 'search for truth'. They realise that certitude is impossible but one isn't railroaded into relativism; just because research cannot definitively be judged on its quality does not mean that some research is not more valid than others. "They are looking for a non-foundational theory of knowledge" between certitude and 'anything goes relativism' and between definitive criteria for judgement and no criteria at all.

CTs have attempted to develop an alternative foundation for knowledge, with alternative conceptions for truth, objectivity etc. Within CT, the ideal is to make transparent the historical socio-political forces that have led to false consciousness, distorted communication, etc. The knowledge must then be put to use so that the exploited can transform themselves and society. "CTs make no pretence that their theory is neutral or divorced from practical action".

The key task for CTs has been to develop a normative foundation for their position. Doing this, they've adopted a critical realism, interpreted objectivity and truth within a historical viewpoint, elaborated a theory of communicative action and rationality, etc. They do this knowing that certitude is impossible but that relativism  is unacceptable. They realise that judging research definitively is impossible but state that some research is more objective and valid than others. Their task has been to establish alternative criteria, alternative to empiricism, post-empiricism and interpretivism.

Interpretivists are guided by human solidarity. hey heavily discuss the 'no theory-free knowledge' concept, the collapse of subject/object dualism, the end of the distinction between facts and values, etc. They push further than PEs and CTs - they redefine traditional concepts such as subjective, objective, truth, relativism etc in non-epistemological terms.

The key position of interpretivists is that researchers do not have a unique hold on knowledge. We cannot judge, in a foundational or epistemological sense, knowledge against opinion. The best we can do is to describe forms of justification for knowledge that are common to a particular group or society at a particular time. Any judgements must be framed by practices and moral concerns, not epistemological ones.

Interpretivists believe that researchers are not privy to privileged knowledge about social life. A research study is thought of as another narrative account of our social lives, alongside other (research and lay) narrative accounts.

However, that is not to say that they believe all research is equally important or justified - they're not 'anything goes' relativists. However, this judgement is not made as to whether some research is more objective (giving an accurate depiction) but because some accounts make sense to us given our interests at this time and place. Judgements we make about knowledge against opinion and good against bad research are practical and moral tasks, not epistemological ones. Interpretivists must elaborate what lies beyond epistemology and beyond the thought that there are special abstract criteria for judging research quality.

1. The need to fill the vacuum left by empiricism with another theory of knowledge: PEs and CTs agree with this; we must be able to say something special about genuine knowledge against false claims and about good against bad research. Good research is defined in terms of objectivity. Interps do not desire to develop a theory of knowledge and believe that there is no vacuum to fill. The absence of a theory of knowledge does not mean that all claims to knowledge and all research are equal, but not better because they are more objective but what we can agree on at any given time/place.
2. Theories of knowledge differ between PEs and CTs. PEs want modified empiricism but CTs want an alternative basis for knowledge. Both have adopted realism and make claims to objectivity but have different concepts of these definitions. PEs see objectivity as true to reality as it exists. CTs seem objectivity in terms of historical distortions that have led to the present false consciousness. PEs believe that objectivity is a matter of detachment. CTs believe objectivity can only be understood in terms of commitment to the emancipation and empowerment of those who are unaware of the reality of their situations.

These differences are clearest when it comes to the interpretation of meaning, i.e. in hermeneutics.

PE make a distinction between meaning and significance. Meaning has independent existence and can be known (in principle if not in practice) at any given moment, as it actually is, separate from the interests and purposes of the interpreter. An objective account of what an author meant is one that has accurately captured that meaning. Meaning is given this status as an external referent point against which to assess interpretation; therefore we can assess the extent to which an interpreter has got it right or wrong.

Making this interpretation is not arbitrary. Using the regulative ideal of objectivity the author makes a hypothesis with a systematic approach. The extent to which the interpreter applies data collection and analysis can be judged. Furthermore, they explain how their subjectivities are made explicit and how discomfiting evidence was sought.

CTs make good on their versions of realism and objectivity with a critical or depth hermeneutics. Interpretation doesn't mean an accurate representation of the author's meaning, because the author may be mistaken. An objective interpretation points out to the victim of false consciousness the reasons for their illusions/distorted communication. In other words, an interpreter must depict what an author meant and also assess that meaning in light of objective historical conditions. This will lead to true meaning and the possibility that empowerment and emancipation will follow. Therefore, good critical research is that in which the researcher has been reflexive, clarified historical conditions, collaborated with those studied and educated meaning as to the true nature of their conditions.

Interps don't see hermeneutics in terms of theories, as they are not interested in theories of knowledge. They believe meaning only comes into being as a result of dialogue between the interpreter and that to be interpreted. There is therefore no objective or 'right' interpretation. However, this doesn't mean that there is no good or bad research - one interpretation is often agreed to be better than another. All one can do to convince another to accept their interpretation through providing materials that best support it. Interpretivists see criteria not as abstract standards but as open-ended evolving lists of traits that characterise what we think research should do and be like.

Criteria for judging social and educational research

PEs and CTs, based on their interest in a theory of knowledge, have both attempted to establish some form of abstract, general and universal criteria for distinguishing the quality of research.

PEs: Their realism leads them to judge that research which more accurately depicts reality (ie is more objective) from less accurate depictions (less objective). Whilst mistakes can be made, over time, with more research and analysis, more accurate judgements can be made. PEs differentiate between valid research and important/relevant research - this has been carried over from empiricism. Research can be of no practical or theoretical importance but can be valid through employing appropriate data collection and analysis and through thorough research. A view of importance is, necessarily, more subjective.

To CTs, good research must be both theoretically well developed and lead to emancipation and empowerment (i.e practically based). These are addressed through validity. Judgement is the extent to which the researcher accurately captures how people interpret their own expressions and those of others. This also needs to be understood in terms of the historical conditions that have led to these interpretations. Finally, good critical research must have catalytic validity - it must lead to or inspire practical action. Because of this, CTs are less likely to make a distinction between good research and important research. A researcher could objectively depict a person's interpretation and determine that the interpretation is mistaken or an illusion but not inspire people to act on that knowledge; therefore meeting the criterion of theoretical success but not that of practical agency, so it is invalid and unimportant.

Interpretivists: As the criteria problem is not an epistemological problem, criteria are not conceptualised as abstract standards. Instead, they are characterising traits. To argue that some research is good is to advance an argument for the particular traits that you think should characterise that study. Therefore decisions about the quality of an interpretive study draw on exemplars of that research tradition, involve judgemental interpretation and are a practical-moral affair.

Practical consequences

Within empiricism it was thought (in principle) that an objectivity of judgement about quality of research was possible. However, in reality, this was only ever loose and imprecise. PEs believe that although mistakes in judgement of research do occur, in the long haul, it will if it *is* good research, come to the forefront. This has implications for peer review of research journal articles.

P. 158: "It appears that there is little prospect for universal criteria to distinguish good research from bad" therefore there's little sense in the notion of a community of all researchers.

Potential concern related to the problem of criteria is the status of social and educational research/ers - no longer such as 'special or privileged knowledge', although it does still occur in PEs and CTs because of their self-reflection, openness to criticism, systematicness in thinking than non-researchers. Interpretivists shy away from this idea of a 'hierarchy of knowledge'. In the absence of a theory of knowledge there is no point worrying about a hierarchy of knowledge. There's no special knowledge about knowing and therefore no special, abstract way of distinguishing knowledge from opinion and good from bad research. Research is therefore knowledge that is different from, and expressed differently from the knowledge and language of the lay person. However, it is not superior knowledge - research is another voice in the conversation.

Summary

If PEs and CTs are correct that there is a theory of knowledge to replace the empiricist theory of knowledge, then there are abstract criteria/standards for distinguishing knowledge from belief and good from bad research. These criteria are loose and imprecise but are sufficient for the task of distinguishing good/bad research. Therefore these criteria can also serve as the basis for the claim that research knowledge is superior to other forms of knowledge - because it can be judged.

If there is no theory of knowledge (I.e. interpretivism) then there are no (epistemological) criteria for distinguishing good research from bad and knowledge from belief. Instead, there are characterising traits which are expressions of our values. The attempt to distinguish knowledge from opinion and good research from bad is a practical and moral task, not an epistemological one.

What  next? Questions to answer.

PEs: Standing between the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth, they have yet to come up with a convincing theory which draws from both. They also acknowledge their uncertainty about the role of empirical evidence in theory choice in light of there being no theory-free observation.

CTs: Can they justify that their critique is more than just another possibility (amongst many others) for understanding the social and educational world? Is their critique of ideology only another ideology? Have *they* escaped the historical distortions and false consciousness that everyone else is enveloped within?

Interps: Have they actually moved beyond a theory of knowledge, or just side-stepped it? "A judgement that a research study is good is never more than an expression of the fact that people, guided by the ideal of human solidarity, have come to agreement about the quality of that study".

What this means???

There's no agreement on the criteria that are used to consider what is good/bad research. Different groups use different means or even believe that there is no clear way except through agreement on characteristic traits at that moment in time.

CTs believe that change should occur. PEs do not seem that different from empiricists.

Assignment 1 - some tutor comments

These are just brief notes of things the tutor said, in no particular order, and with no interpretation...

• Locate the work within the professional setting - make it contextualised
• Make it conceptually sophisticated - this is level 8!
• Write yourself into the assignment; place yourself in that context, using reflexivity, the influence of the subjective self in research
• Start with a short biographical narrative: who I am, what I do and why the question is significant to me.
• Positionality: the understanding of where you are positioned within the research paradigms/ How do you want to be judged? What standards and criteria should be used? This relates to the philosophical underpinnings of the research. Hopefully it will follow through to the thesis.
• Develop a discussion around different frameworks, honing in on a particular perspective relevant to who I am, my research interests, and how it will go.
• Where do I stand in relation to these deep ontological views?
• Collect empirical data, interpret it and theorise around it.

The truth? A truth? Multiple truths? No truth?

The following notes come from the hand-written notes I made on Saturday 3rd Oct 2015. It may not make sense, as I don't really understand most of it at the moment! Extra reading to do via hyperlinks.

Rorty believes that objectivity in research cannot be achieved. So, what is truth? How can we tell what good research is?
More Rorty reading to complete

Objectivity implies distance/separation from the object, to understand the world 'as it is'.

Kant believed that there are two worlds: the noumenal world of things that exist, and the phenomenal world, which is mediated through our own senses. There is an unbridgeable gap; we are not separate from the context we research. The 'self' and 'other' are always conjoined.

Reflexivity is used to examine, as best we can, to understand our values and the influence they have on the research process. We can never *fully* do that: where does the inside/outside frontier begin? Also, we're human and always interacting therefore cannot fully identify our values, judgements and prejudices. Who we are is contingent on who we are interacting ; there is no essence of identity, so driving down to truth is pointless. We cannot reach a true good/certainty; Plato believes there is something more real lying behind the reality we know.

The present is inauthentic and we work towards a future which is more authentic. However, this doesn't happen.

The dominant view of research is that there *is* a truth. Intepretivism posits that there is not.

Over recent years, there has been a move towards the use of 'mixed methods' becoming popular, as it involves both qualitative and quantitative research. The suggestion is that it is therefore more valid, authentic and with a degree of validity. However.... quantitative data collection drives forward many policies, to the detriment of many services (would need evidence to support this argument!). Greater credence is given to quantitative research results than qualitative.

Note to self: where do I stand in relation to these deep ontological views?

Rigour: we try to ensure objectivity but we are ultimately doomed to failure...

Thomas Kuhn, in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, talked about paradigms. He suggested that there are normal periods of science, with agreement on sets of beliefs underlying the science process. Occasionally, someone comes along with revolutionary ideas, leading to the displacement of the theory  a paradigm shift.

A paradigm is a conceptual framework. Unlike within science, different frameworks an co-exist in the social sciences, capturing different ideas about the nature of research. There is a 'leakiness' between different paradigms, and often bigger differences within research paradigms than between them (as suggested by Hammersley).

These paradigms both simplify and conceal/obscure - they reveal and conceal.

Definitions and Paradigms

Ontology: to do with the nature of truth, the nature of being. Whether you believe in truth  or not is an ontological question. Do we believe in *a* reality, are is it relativist?

Epistemology: What do we know? Theories of knowledge. There is also standpoint epistemology e.g. feminist viewpoint. Epistemology is also a statement on the nature of being.

Ontology and epistemology are inseparable. It is impossible to have a theory of knowledge without a theory of being.

Methodology: An approach to [research?] It is the underpinning philosophical/conceptual frameworks guiding our research.

See the grid (2/10/15): An adaption by Garrett of Sparkes' (1993) assumptions underlying paradigms.

It looks at three paradigms: post-positivism (PP),  Constructivism/Interpretivism (Int) and Critical Theory (CT).
Post-structuralists would suggest that the grid is nonsensical as they cannot be separated.

Positivism: Auguste Comte followed an empiricist epistemology and believed that you can apply the research rules of the natural sciences to the social world with practical justification leading to social progress. Examples include evidence-based practice, empirical data.

Nowadays we discuss post-positivism (PP) as positivism was discredited, as absolute truth cannot exist. PPs attempt to proximate the truth (BUT... how can we know how near or far we are from the truth?). They believe we can try to minimise our subjectivity but this is ostensibly impossible.

PP Ontology: External-realist - reality exists but can never be fully apprehended. Correspondence theory of truth.

PP epistemology: Modified objectivist//dualist: objectivity remains an ideal but can only be approximated.

PP Methodology: Nomothetic (generalizable)/experimental/manipulative; wants to generalise.

Our writing must use narrative devices to persuade the reader of our understanding of the truth, e.g. detailed field notes, rich data from interviews, to give a strong sense of context through our writing.

INT ontology: relativist: there are multiple mental constructions, socially and experientially based, which are local and specific.

INT epistemology: subjectivist - researcher ad researched are fused into a single entity. Findings are the creation of the process of interaction between the two.

INT methodology: hermeneutic/dialectic/ideographic - individual constructions/understandings are refined through a process of dialogue. This paradigm privileges cases, e.g. ethnography, understanding a culture in depth though a personal lens. Within hermeneutics (e.g. Heidegger and Gadamer) they embrace the frameworks but realise that we cannot know what they are, but they do allow us to challenge our judgements, 'placing prejudices at risk'. This changes us - reflexivity. reflexivity means adaptation of, for example, your interview questions, reacting to the interviewee, asking different questions, moving amongst questions - the interview is a conversation.

Truth is transient, based on social agreement in this paradigm.

CT Ontology: Critical realist/internal idealist

CT epistemology: Subjectivist/interactive

CT methodology: ideographic/participative/transformative - an ambition to transform for those at a social disadvantage, i.e. make a difference. You may collaborate with those you're researching, doing research with a group rather than to a group.


Questions to answer: Where do I sit? I suppose, without knowing very much at all, and by looking at my responses to the initial 'definitions of research' activity, I feel I sit most comfortably within the interpretivist paradigm. Despite my background in science (or maybe because of it), I feel that it doesn't provide the sort of information I feel I want to gain for my research. I feel uncomfortable with the critical theorists viewpoint of active involvement to make a change. We'll see how this develops.