Weekend 1 reading: Patricia Hill Collins - afrocentric feminist epistemology

Collins, P. H. (1991). Towards an afrocentric feminist epistemology. In: P. H. Collins (ed.). Black feminist thought. London, United Kingdom: Routledge.

Black feminist thought, like all specialised thought, reflects the interests and standpoints of its creators. Tracing the origin and diffusion of any body of specialised thought reveals its affinity to the power of the group that created it. Because elite white men and their representatives control structures of knowledge validation, white male interests pervade the thematic content of traditional scholarship. As a result, black females' experiences with work, family, motherhood, political activism and sexual politics have been routinely distorted in or excluded from traditional academic discourse.

"Black feminist thought as specialised thought reflects the thematic content of African-American women's experiences. Subordinate groups have to use alternative ways to create independent self-definitions and self-valuations. African-American women have developed a distinctive Black female's standpoint and have done so by using alternative ways of producing and validating knowledge.

"Epistemology: the study of the philosophical problems in concepts of knowledge and truth."
To investigate this work, Collins consulted established bodies of academic research but also her own experiences and those of other Af-Am females - this is illustrated by the use of the word 2our" rather than "their" within the research. Few statistics are reported; instead. the voices of Black women are used. This allows Collins to explore the thematic content of Black feminist work in a way that doesn't violate its basic epistemological framework.

Black women intellectuals often encounter two distinct epistemologies - elite white male interests, and Afrocentric feminist concerns.

Eurocentric masculinist knowledge validation process

The Eurocentric masculinist knowledge validation process: the institutions, paradigms and other elements of the knowledge validation process controlled by elite white men.
Two political criteria influence the knowledge validation process:

1. Knowledge claims are evaluated by a community of experts whose members represent the standpoints of the groups from which they originate;
2. Each community of experts must maintain its credibility as defined by the larger group in which it is situated and from which it draws its taken-for-granted knowledge.

Therefore scholars challenging the basic beliefs of the culture at large are deemed less credible than those supporting popular perspectives. This has suppressed Black feminist thought. Accepting a few "safe" outsiders legitimises keeping outsiders out. Those who challenge the taken-for-granted assumptions run the risk of being ostracised.

Af-Am female academics face potential rejection of knowledge claims on epistemological grounds (theories of knowledge). Rather than using Eurocentric, masculinist criteria for assessing knowledge, they may use other criteria. These methods of validating knowledge claims must be acceptable to the group controlling the knowledge validation process.

For example, positivist approaches of validating knowledge do so by producing objective generalisations, distanced from values, interests and emotions of the researcher. Positivist methodological approaches:

1. Distance the researcher from the 'object' of study;
2. Show an absence of emotions;
3. Ethics and values are deemed inappropriate;
4. Adversarial debates are the preferred method of ascertaining truth.

For these reasons, it's unlikely that Black women would use a positivist epistemological stance in rearticulating a Black female standpoint. Back females are more likely to choose an alternative epistemology, using different standards consistent with Black females' criteria for substantiated knowledge.

So, what does this look like? The core African value system that existed prior to racial oppression, and also a sharing of the common experience of oppression leads to a distinctive Afrocentric epistemology. This is similar to the feminist advance of a history of gender oppression which led to the feminist epistemology. There is an alternative epistemology for Back women - an Afrocentric feminist viewpoint. There is a discussion of the overlap between the feminist and Afrocentric standpoints - with Black women belong to 2both/and" - there is some overlap but also some separate, in addition. The Afrocentric feminist epistemology is rooted in the everyday experiences of AfAm women.

What are the dimensions of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology?

1. Concrete experience as a criterion of meaning

AfAs use wisdom to assess knowledge, and an understanding of their oppression through race, gender and probably class. "Knowledge without wisdom is adequate for the powerful but wisdom is essential to the survival of the subordinate". Those individuals who have lived through the experience about which they claim to be experts are more believable and credible than those who have merely read or thought about such experiences; i.e. the 'lived experience'.

Some scholars claim that women, too, as a group are more likely than men to use concrete knowledge in assessing knowledge claims. Therefore, in valuing the concrete, AfAMFems invoke not only an Afrocentric tradition but a woman's tradition as well. There is considerable institutional support in traditional AfAm communities for valuing concrete experience - sharing it through the 2sisterhood".

2. The use of dialogue in assessing knowledge claims

"Dialogue is a talk between two subjects, not speech of subject and object - it is a humanising speech, one that challenges and resists domination."
Through dialogue, connectedness rather than separation is an essential component of the knowledge validation process. The use of dialogue has Afrocentric roots, seeking harmony. Different to adversarial debate, it has its basis in African-based oral tradition. The use of call-and-response discourse needs the active participation of all. For ideas to be tested and validated, everyone in the group must participate. Black female centrality in families and community organisations provides AfAm women with a high degree of support for invoking dialogue as a dimension of an Afrocentric feminist epistemology. This ties in with a female way of knowing.

3. The ethic of caring

"Talking with the heart" taps the ethic of caring - another dimension of an alternative epistemology used by AfAm females.

• Emphasis on individual uniqueness, rooted in a tradition of African humanism;
• Use of emotions in dialogues - emotion shows a speaker believes in the validity of an argument;
• capacity for empathy.

There is growing evidence that the ethic of caring may be part of women's' experience as well.

4. The ethic of personal accountability

People are expected to be accountable for their knowledge claims. AfAms believe it is essential for individuals to have personal positions on issues and assume full responsibility for arguing their validity. Knowledge claims made by individuals respected for their moral and ethical connections to their ideas will carry more weight than those offered by less respected figures.

It seems (with limited research) that there is a female model for moral development, therefore there is another convergence between Afrocentric and feminist institutions.

"An alternative epistemology challenges...knowledge an opens up the question of whether what has been taken to be true can stand the test of alternative ways of validating truth".

My thoughts

Very interesting. I've heard talk of intersectionality on Twitter, and not really understood it (or taken much notice of it) until now. It seems clear to me that experiences and understandings will vary. What a middle class white woman conceives of as their feminist viewpoint will be different, though no more or less valid, than that of a Black woman. However, the Black/transgendered/with impairments will have additional barriers of oppression. It was fascinating to learn of different ways in which research can be viewed as 'valid', based on cultural roots. It's obvious that this should be so, but my own view has been blinkered by the standard white Eurocentric masculinist approach that it is very hard to conceive of alternative voices towards validity, as suggested here. Something to read  more about. It's unlikely to be something I develop, but it has made me more aware of the frames within which I operate, as being a privileged, white, cis-, able-bodied woman.

If I had to categorise Collins, it would be as a critical theorist, with one key concern being from a feminist viewpoint, though of course taking in other oppressed sections of society, particularly that of African-Americans. As a CT, she would espouse 'transformation'.

Weekend 1 reading: Smith and the problem of criteria

Smith, J. K. (1993). The problem of criteria. In: J. K. Smith (ed.). After the demise of empiricism. The problem of judging social and educational enquiry. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

This is another of the weekend 1 readings. Smith is an interpretivist. Again, as I don't really yet understand the topic, a lot of this is verbatim and will need to be paraphrased or quoted if I use it in work.

PEs, CTs and interpretivists can all agree:

• There's no definitive way to distinguish knowledge from opinion or from false claims;
• There's no definitive way to sift good research from bad.

All three paradigms agree that the empirical theory of knowledge is undermined by the fact that theory-free observation is impossible, and so on.

The end of the common ground

However, as the three theories have developed, so have major differences in their positions. The differences lie in the depth to which the PE ideas of theory-free knowledge, abandonment of direct realism and collapse of fact-value and subject-object distinctions are taken.

PEs: To develop a "modified" version of empiricism. They are unwilling to abandon completely the concepts of truth and objectivity as ideals. They suggest that, without these ideals, it is impossible to determine knowledge from opinion and good research from bad. They view the task as to modify empiricism rather than abandon it.

PEs have sought to develop the philosophical doctrine of realism, from 'naïve/direct' to 'sophisticated/indirect' realism. They also argue for the importance of certain values key to the scientific process, e.g. being guided by the 'search for truth'. They realise that certitude is impossible but one isn't railroaded into relativism; just because research cannot definitively be judged on its quality does not mean that some research is not more valid than others. "They are looking for a non-foundational theory of knowledge" between certitude and 'anything goes relativism' and between definitive criteria for judgement and no criteria at all.

CTs have attempted to develop an alternative foundation for knowledge, with alternative conceptions for truth, objectivity etc. Within CT, the ideal is to make transparent the historical socio-political forces that have led to false consciousness, distorted communication, etc. The knowledge must then be put to use so that the exploited can transform themselves and society. "CTs make no pretence that their theory is neutral or divorced from practical action".

The key task for CTs has been to develop a normative foundation for their position. Doing this, they've adopted a critical realism, interpreted objectivity and truth within a historical viewpoint, elaborated a theory of communicative action and rationality, etc. They do this knowing that certitude is impossible but that relativism  is unacceptable. They realise that judging research definitively is impossible but state that some research is more objective and valid than others. Their task has been to establish alternative criteria, alternative to empiricism, post-empiricism and interpretivism.

Interpretivists are guided by human solidarity. hey heavily discuss the 'no theory-free knowledge' concept, the collapse of subject/object dualism, the end of the distinction between facts and values, etc. They push further than PEs and CTs - they redefine traditional concepts such as subjective, objective, truth, relativism etc in non-epistemological terms.

The key position of interpretivists is that researchers do not have a unique hold on knowledge. We cannot judge, in a foundational or epistemological sense, knowledge against opinion. The best we can do is to describe forms of justification for knowledge that are common to a particular group or society at a particular time. Any judgements must be framed by practices and moral concerns, not epistemological ones.

Interpretivists believe that researchers are not privy to privileged knowledge about social life. A research study is thought of as another narrative account of our social lives, alongside other (research and lay) narrative accounts.

However, that is not to say that they believe all research is equally important or justified - they're not 'anything goes' relativists. However, this judgement is not made as to whether some research is more objective (giving an accurate depiction) but because some accounts make sense to us given our interests at this time and place. Judgements we make about knowledge against opinion and good against bad research are practical and moral tasks, not epistemological ones. Interpretivists must elaborate what lies beyond epistemology and beyond the thought that there are special abstract criteria for judging research quality.

1. The need to fill the vacuum left by empiricism with another theory of knowledge: PEs and CTs agree with this; we must be able to say something special about genuine knowledge against false claims and about good against bad research. Good research is defined in terms of objectivity. Interps do not desire to develop a theory of knowledge and believe that there is no vacuum to fill. The absence of a theory of knowledge does not mean that all claims to knowledge and all research are equal, but not better because they are more objective but what we can agree on at any given time/place.
2. Theories of knowledge differ between PEs and CTs. PEs want modified empiricism but CTs want an alternative basis for knowledge. Both have adopted realism and make claims to objectivity but have different concepts of these definitions. PEs see objectivity as true to reality as it exists. CTs seem objectivity in terms of historical distortions that have led to the present false consciousness. PEs believe that objectivity is a matter of detachment. CTs believe objectivity can only be understood in terms of commitment to the emancipation and empowerment of those who are unaware of the reality of their situations.

These differences are clearest when it comes to the interpretation of meaning, i.e. in hermeneutics.

PE make a distinction between meaning and significance. Meaning has independent existence and can be known (in principle if not in practice) at any given moment, as it actually is, separate from the interests and purposes of the interpreter. An objective account of what an author meant is one that has accurately captured that meaning. Meaning is given this status as an external referent point against which to assess interpretation; therefore we can assess the extent to which an interpreter has got it right or wrong.

Making this interpretation is not arbitrary. Using the regulative ideal of objectivity the author makes a hypothesis with a systematic approach. The extent to which the interpreter applies data collection and analysis can be judged. Furthermore, they explain how their subjectivities are made explicit and how discomfiting evidence was sought.

CTs make good on their versions of realism and objectivity with a critical or depth hermeneutics. Interpretation doesn't mean an accurate representation of the author's meaning, because the author may be mistaken. An objective interpretation points out to the victim of false consciousness the reasons for their illusions/distorted communication. In other words, an interpreter must depict what an author meant and also assess that meaning in light of objective historical conditions. This will lead to true meaning and the possibility that empowerment and emancipation will follow. Therefore, good critical research is that in which the researcher has been reflexive, clarified historical conditions, collaborated with those studied and educated meaning as to the true nature of their conditions.

Interps don't see hermeneutics in terms of theories, as they are not interested in theories of knowledge. They believe meaning only comes into being as a result of dialogue between the interpreter and that to be interpreted. There is therefore no objective or 'right' interpretation. However, this doesn't mean that there is no good or bad research - one interpretation is often agreed to be better than another. All one can do to convince another to accept their interpretation through providing materials that best support it. Interpretivists see criteria not as abstract standards but as open-ended evolving lists of traits that characterise what we think research should do and be like.

Criteria for judging social and educational research

PEs and CTs, based on their interest in a theory of knowledge, have both attempted to establish some form of abstract, general and universal criteria for distinguishing the quality of research.

PEs: Their realism leads them to judge that research which more accurately depicts reality (ie is more objective) from less accurate depictions (less objective). Whilst mistakes can be made, over time, with more research and analysis, more accurate judgements can be made. PEs differentiate between valid research and important/relevant research - this has been carried over from empiricism. Research can be of no practical or theoretical importance but can be valid through employing appropriate data collection and analysis and through thorough research. A view of importance is, necessarily, more subjective.

To CTs, good research must be both theoretically well developed and lead to emancipation and empowerment (i.e practically based). These are addressed through validity. Judgement is the extent to which the researcher accurately captures how people interpret their own expressions and those of others. This also needs to be understood in terms of the historical conditions that have led to these interpretations. Finally, good critical research must have catalytic validity - it must lead to or inspire practical action. Because of this, CTs are less likely to make a distinction between good research and important research. A researcher could objectively depict a person's interpretation and determine that the interpretation is mistaken or an illusion but not inspire people to act on that knowledge; therefore meeting the criterion of theoretical success but not that of practical agency, so it is invalid and unimportant.

Interpretivists: As the criteria problem is not an epistemological problem, criteria are not conceptualised as abstract standards. Instead, they are characterising traits. To argue that some research is good is to advance an argument for the particular traits that you think should characterise that study. Therefore decisions about the quality of an interpretive study draw on exemplars of that research tradition, involve judgemental interpretation and are a practical-moral affair.

Practical consequences

Within empiricism it was thought (in principle) that an objectivity of judgement about quality of research was possible. However, in reality, this was only ever loose and imprecise. PEs believe that although mistakes in judgement of research do occur, in the long haul, it will if it *is* good research, come to the forefront. This has implications for peer review of research journal articles.

P. 158: "It appears that there is little prospect for universal criteria to distinguish good research from bad" therefore there's little sense in the notion of a community of all researchers.

Potential concern related to the problem of criteria is the status of social and educational research/ers - no longer such as 'special or privileged knowledge', although it does still occur in PEs and CTs because of their self-reflection, openness to criticism, systematicness in thinking than non-researchers. Interpretivists shy away from this idea of a 'hierarchy of knowledge'. In the absence of a theory of knowledge there is no point worrying about a hierarchy of knowledge. There's no special knowledge about knowing and therefore no special, abstract way of distinguishing knowledge from opinion and good from bad research. Research is therefore knowledge that is different from, and expressed differently from the knowledge and language of the lay person. However, it is not superior knowledge - research is another voice in the conversation.

Summary

If PEs and CTs are correct that there is a theory of knowledge to replace the empiricist theory of knowledge, then there are abstract criteria/standards for distinguishing knowledge from belief and good from bad research. These criteria are loose and imprecise but are sufficient for the task of distinguishing good/bad research. Therefore these criteria can also serve as the basis for the claim that research knowledge is superior to other forms of knowledge - because it can be judged.

If there is no theory of knowledge (I.e. interpretivism) then there are no (epistemological) criteria for distinguishing good research from bad and knowledge from belief. Instead, there are characterising traits which are expressions of our values. The attempt to distinguish knowledge from opinion and good research from bad is a practical and moral task, not an epistemological one.

What  next? Questions to answer.

PEs: Standing between the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth, they have yet to come up with a convincing theory which draws from both. They also acknowledge their uncertainty about the role of empirical evidence in theory choice in light of there being no theory-free observation.

CTs: Can they justify that their critique is more than just another possibility (amongst many others) for understanding the social and educational world? Is their critique of ideology only another ideology? Have *they* escaped the historical distortions and false consciousness that everyone else is enveloped within?

Interps: Have they actually moved beyond a theory of knowledge, or just side-stepped it? "A judgement that a research study is good is never more than an expression of the fact that people, guided by the ideal of human solidarity, have come to agreement about the quality of that study".

What this means???

There's no agreement on the criteria that are used to consider what is good/bad research. Different groups use different means or even believe that there is no clear way except through agreement on characteristic traits at that moment in time.

CTs believe that change should occur. PEs do not seem that different from empiricists.

The truth? A truth? Multiple truths? No truth?

The following notes come from the hand-written notes I made on Saturday 3rd Oct 2015. It may not make sense, as I don't really understand most of it at the moment! Extra reading to do via hyperlinks.

Rorty believes that objectivity in research cannot be achieved. So, what is truth? How can we tell what good research is?
More Rorty reading to complete

Objectivity implies distance/separation from the object, to understand the world 'as it is'.

Kant believed that there are two worlds: the noumenal world of things that exist, and the phenomenal world, which is mediated through our own senses. There is an unbridgeable gap; we are not separate from the context we research. The 'self' and 'other' are always conjoined.

Reflexivity is used to examine, as best we can, to understand our values and the influence they have on the research process. We can never *fully* do that: where does the inside/outside frontier begin? Also, we're human and always interacting therefore cannot fully identify our values, judgements and prejudices. Who we are is contingent on who we are interacting ; there is no essence of identity, so driving down to truth is pointless. We cannot reach a true good/certainty; Plato believes there is something more real lying behind the reality we know.

The present is inauthentic and we work towards a future which is more authentic. However, this doesn't happen.

The dominant view of research is that there *is* a truth. Intepretivism posits that there is not.

Over recent years, there has been a move towards the use of 'mixed methods' becoming popular, as it involves both qualitative and quantitative research. The suggestion is that it is therefore more valid, authentic and with a degree of validity. However.... quantitative data collection drives forward many policies, to the detriment of many services (would need evidence to support this argument!). Greater credence is given to quantitative research results than qualitative.

Note to self: where do I stand in relation to these deep ontological views?

Rigour: we try to ensure objectivity but we are ultimately doomed to failure...

Thomas Kuhn, in the Structure of Scientific Revolutions, talked about paradigms. He suggested that there are normal periods of science, with agreement on sets of beliefs underlying the science process. Occasionally, someone comes along with revolutionary ideas, leading to the displacement of the theory  a paradigm shift.

A paradigm is a conceptual framework. Unlike within science, different frameworks an co-exist in the social sciences, capturing different ideas about the nature of research. There is a 'leakiness' between different paradigms, and often bigger differences within research paradigms than between them (as suggested by Hammersley).

These paradigms both simplify and conceal/obscure - they reveal and conceal.

Definitions and Paradigms

Ontology: to do with the nature of truth, the nature of being. Whether you believe in truth  or not is an ontological question. Do we believe in *a* reality, are is it relativist?

Epistemology: What do we know? Theories of knowledge. There is also standpoint epistemology e.g. feminist viewpoint. Epistemology is also a statement on the nature of being.

Ontology and epistemology are inseparable. It is impossible to have a theory of knowledge without a theory of being.

Methodology: An approach to [research?] It is the underpinning philosophical/conceptual frameworks guiding our research.

See the grid (2/10/15): An adaption by Garrett of Sparkes' (1993) assumptions underlying paradigms.

It looks at three paradigms: post-positivism (PP),  Constructivism/Interpretivism (Int) and Critical Theory (CT).
Post-structuralists would suggest that the grid is nonsensical as they cannot be separated.

Positivism: Auguste Comte followed an empiricist epistemology and believed that you can apply the research rules of the natural sciences to the social world with practical justification leading to social progress. Examples include evidence-based practice, empirical data.

Nowadays we discuss post-positivism (PP) as positivism was discredited, as absolute truth cannot exist. PPs attempt to proximate the truth (BUT... how can we know how near or far we are from the truth?). They believe we can try to minimise our subjectivity but this is ostensibly impossible.

PP Ontology: External-realist - reality exists but can never be fully apprehended. Correspondence theory of truth.

PP epistemology: Modified objectivist//dualist: objectivity remains an ideal but can only be approximated.

PP Methodology: Nomothetic (generalizable)/experimental/manipulative; wants to generalise.

Our writing must use narrative devices to persuade the reader of our understanding of the truth, e.g. detailed field notes, rich data from interviews, to give a strong sense of context through our writing.

INT ontology: relativist: there are multiple mental constructions, socially and experientially based, which are local and specific.

INT epistemology: subjectivist - researcher ad researched are fused into a single entity. Findings are the creation of the process of interaction between the two.

INT methodology: hermeneutic/dialectic/ideographic - individual constructions/understandings are refined through a process of dialogue. This paradigm privileges cases, e.g. ethnography, understanding a culture in depth though a personal lens. Within hermeneutics (e.g. Heidegger and Gadamer) they embrace the frameworks but realise that we cannot know what they are, but they do allow us to challenge our judgements, 'placing prejudices at risk'. This changes us - reflexivity. reflexivity means adaptation of, for example, your interview questions, reacting to the interviewee, asking different questions, moving amongst questions - the interview is a conversation.

Truth is transient, based on social agreement in this paradigm.

CT Ontology: Critical realist/internal idealist

CT epistemology: Subjectivist/interactive

CT methodology: ideographic/participative/transformative - an ambition to transform for those at a social disadvantage, i.e. make a difference. You may collaborate with those you're researching, doing research with a group rather than to a group.


Questions to answer: Where do I sit? I suppose, without knowing very much at all, and by looking at my responses to the initial 'definitions of research' activity, I feel I sit most comfortably within the interpretivist paradigm. Despite my background in science (or maybe because of it), I feel that it doesn't provide the sort of information I feel I want to gain for my research. I feel uncomfortable with the critical theorists viewpoint of active involvement to make a change. We'll see how this develops.

More reading... Sparkes on the Paradigms Debate

Alternative title: Help me, my brain is melting...

This was a big article. I got lucky with Eisner as my first read - it was an easier read and made intuitive sense. This overview of three key research paradigms, however, was not so easy.

This wasn't helped by coming at it piecemeal - 20 minutes here, half an hour in the soft play centre there, and so on.

Much of what I'm going to write (and there's lots because I found it so difficult) is pretty much verbatim from the text, as I don't yet have the knowledge to be able to condense. As I always tell students asking about paraphrasing, if you don't understand the text, you can't effectively paraphrase it. So, this is mostly direct from text.

Sparkes, A. C. (1992). The paradigm debate: An extended review and a celebration of difference. In: A. C. Sparks (ed.). Research in physical education and sport. (pp. 9-60). London, United Kingdom: Falmer.

There has been a revolution in philosophical paradigms, including in Sparkes' specialism (PE), where empirical predominance is being rethought. [Bear in mind that this was written in 1992, so there has probably been a lot more re-thinking since then!]. The purpose of the paper is as a framework to aid understanding of the debate that is taking place. It covers three paradigms, interpretive, critical and positivist.

There is a discussion on the nature of paradigms but effectively that they are a shared conception of problems and the methods shared within them. They can be described as a shared world view, a way of breaking down the complexity of the world. Paradigms are deeply embedded within the researcher's own socialisations, experiences and framework. Herein lies their strength and their weakness. The strength is that they make action possible without thinking about *every* angle of research. Their weakness is that there are hidden, unquestioned assumptions within each paradigm - an awareness of them is needed to ensure an understanding of the unseen frameworks within which the researcher operates. Paradigms act as a theoretical lens through which we experience the world.

To add to what Sparkes says, and to link to Eisner: these frameworks and assumptions within each paradigm don't just affect how we think and act but at a more fundamental level it will act as a barrier as to whether we *see* specific aspects of what we observe. I'm not sure that's clear, but I think I know what I mean there. We are blinkered, so we don't know that we can't see something, so we have no ability to research/understand it, because to us, it's not there!

I suppose it makes me uncomfortable that Sparkes states "the individual must not only learn the content of the field but also a particular way of seeing the world that eventually becomes not only unquestioned but unquestionable." Is this a healthy way of working? Perhaps so, If the alternative is a philosophical dam against which we ultimately can't move because of the inertia of philosophical vacillation.

During the 'socialisation' process into a paradigm the researcher absorbs assumptions on ontology and epistemology. Social scientists need to question whether there is an external 'reality' or one coloured by individual consciousness and experience - ONTOLOGY.

External realists of positivism vs the internal idealists of interpretivism.

The epistemology - how we know what is true or false - differs too. The objectivist view is that knowledge is capable of being transmitted in a tangible form and is 'hard' and 'real'. The subjectivist epistemology believes that the truth/knowledge is subjective and as such subject to interpretation through our individual lenses or the lenses employed when working within a specific paradigm.

There is a third set of assumptions, based on human nature:
Deterministic: people react to their environment and are products of it;
Voluntaristic: people have control over at least some of their environment and exhibit autonomy, "actively creating their environment".

The standpoint of the researcher on these three sets of assumption affects how they gather date:

1. External realist vs internal idealist
2. Objectivist vs subjectivist
3. Deterministic vs voluntaristic.

Sparkes discusses these assumptions to show that all researchers make assumptions relating to ontology, epistemology, human nature and methodology. These assumptions cluster and are given coherence within the frameworks of particular paradigms. No researcher approaches research as a blank slate - ontological assumptions give rise to epistemological assumptions which have methodological implications for the choices made regarding particular techniques of data collection, interpretation of findings and the ways they are understood and discussed in texts or orally presented.

Essentially, those working within different paradigms view the world in different ways, investigate situations in different ways and report the results of their investigations in different ways. The researchers' basic assumptions concerning ontology (reality), epistemology (truth), the physical world and the social world affect all aspects of research. Confusion is increased through the inaccurate use of words such as methods, research methods, and methodology. Sparkes uses the following definitions:
Methodology: the philosophical underpinning of the investigation
Research strategy: the design and carrying out of the investigation
Research techniques: specific methods to yield data, e.g. questionnaire construction, statistical analysis.
Methods cannot be independent of the philosophical underpinning and similarly the interpretation of results and their recording. "Techniques of data collection do not constitute the uniqueness of a paradigm" - the same data collection method can be use din both a positivist and behavioural way but the meaning put on the findings will differ, as well as the content gathered.

In investigating various paradigms, Sparkes explains that it is important to avoid caricatures. It must be remembered that within each paradigm there is heterogeneity - different traditions within each form of paradigm.

The Positivist Paradigm

This has a  long history, and uses the notions of science as a framework. It is historically important - Sparkes discusses its role within PE and that it offers "almost unquestionable respectability". For example, objective measurement of teaching and learning, the use of standardised data collection instruments. Inter-related assumptions listed by Popkewitz (1984) shape the positivist paradigm:

1. theories are universal and not affected by the values of the researchers;
2. the science is "disinterested" and not affected by the values of the researchers;
3. the social world can be reduced to variables that can be studied independently;
4. concepts can be formalised and defined so as to provide dependent and independent variables to manipulate;
5. use of quantitative analysis to reduce ambiguity.

Ontologically: the social world is ontologically objective and concepts such as intelligence, self esteem exist separate from the individual. The researcher observes nature in such a way as to not affect nature's answers. Sources of bias must be recognised and controlled. Internal and external validity, as well as reliability must be provided by the research techniques.

VALIDITY can be established when the extent to which conclusions represent empirical reality, and also when assessing whether the constructs devised by researchers measure the categories of human experience that occur. "A judgement is 'true' when it corresponds to this external reality and 'false' when it does not - the correspondence theory of truth. Observation (empirical verification) is needed so that we can judge whether a statement is true. To achieve objectivity, positivists follow the 'scientific method'.

The interpretive paradigm

In contrast to the positivist paradigm is the interpretive paradigm, an umbrella term within which sit a whole range of methodologies. We cannot lump them all together as 'qualitative vs quantitative' as some interpretive methodologies are at least partially quantitative. It only cam einto more common usage in the late 1980s, and developed as a reaction against positivism, as it was suggested that studying the social world couldn't be achieved objectively.

The interpretive paradigm adopts an 'internalist idealist' ontology and a subjective epistemology and prefer an IDEOGRAPHIC methodology. For example, facts only exist within the context of a mental framework (construct); i.e. reality is only viewed through a window tinted by values. Knowledge is the consequence of human activity, i.e it is a human construct and can never be agreed as ultimately true. The paradigm takes a position of RELATIVISM - there are multiple realities existing within different individual's minds, and are open to subjective interpretation. The mind of the researcher doesn't "create" the findings, but colours the interpretation of the findings, assigning meaning and intentions makes the social reality.

The paradigm rejects the positivist idea of an independently existing reality that can be found through specific methods. Even 'objective' methods are value-laden and open to interpretation. It takes an EMIC approach. Sparkes discusses authors' views on ethnography, explaining social reality from within the group, as opposed to the positivist view, detachedly looking in.

Interpretive research and the 'researcher as instrument'
Sparkes discusses researchers viewing the role of the researcher within ethnographic studies as being *the* most important research instrument - it is "engagement of the self". Within ethnographic studies, the data that are not gathered, as well as those that are, shape the research - the framework within the researcher will affect the data gathered.

In interpretivism, truth/validity isn't a matter of correspondence, it is a matter of COHERENCE - what is true is what we can agree (within the confines of that time/context) is true. 2Within a coherence theory of truth, a proposition is judged to be true if it COHERES (connects consistently) with other propositions in a scheme or network at a particular time - COHERENCE is a matter of internal relations as opposed to the DEGREE OF CORRESPONDENCE with some external reality.

Popkewitz describes objectivity in this area is the result of inter-subjective consensus through social interaction. He also states that this also applies to the scientific community - knowledge of science is considered valid and truthful only insofar as it reflects the consensus of the scholarly community.

The "truth" of an ethnographic report depends on how well it "rings true" to natives and colleagues within the field. However, interpretation remains an INTERPRETATION of a set of events; credibility is not necessarily is altered by agreement or disagreement by the subjects. The subjects will have their own interpretation of their social world (first order constructs) which often differ from those of the researcher (second order constructs). It is still important for the researcher to check their findings and that certain words were used/events took place. It's also important to discuss interpretations even though there may be disagreements - these, in themselves, can be of use and provide further data for interpretation - REFLEXIVE ELABORATION. Furthermore, there may be disagreements amongst scholars studying the same group. These differences are generally those of emphasis or orientation. "qualitative research cannot be made researcher-proof". Because multiple interpretations can be made even on the same group, there can be 'many truths' available. So, with multiple interpretations possible, which is 'best' or 'most nearly correct'?

There can be multiple truths through multiple interpretations, but we must make sure that we don't lose our critical abilities - not all interpretations stand up to scrutiny. This is true, even though interpretivism is relativistic. There are three main views of relativism (Rorty, 1985):

1. every belief is as good as any other;
2. "true" is an equivocal term, with as many meanings as there are procedures of justification;
3. There is nothing to be said about truth or rationality apart from descriptions of the familiar procedures or justifications which our society uses in areas of inquiry.

Most interpretivists adhere to the third view - judgements of truth are relative to a particular framework, paradigm or point of view. Therefore, not everything goes; researchers within an interpretive paradigm differentiate between 'good' and 'bad' research, according to their own framework.

Some researchers have discussed how constructivist research can best be judged, in this case. e.g. trustworthiness, credibility, transferability, dependability and authenticity. Under these come sub-lists - these checklists help to judge the 'goodness' of constructivist research.

Harris states that at least three levels of interpretation are needed for 'good' qualitative research:

1. Grounded in shared understandings about the culture developed between the researcher and members of the group being examined.
2. Must include the researcher’s insights of the culture that are not well-articulated by the members of the group;
3. Must include theoretical generalisations that go beyond the group culture to link to relevant parts of other research.

Athens discusses here criteria for evaluating qualitative studies.

1. Theoretical import – the contribution towards new theories or refinement of existing theories;
2. Whether the scientific concepts are empirically grounded;
3. “Scientific credibility” – the researcher must make the study credible by providing an account of the research along with a description of the results. An account is a story told by the researcher about how they performed the research in question.

It is important to remember that different researchers using different frameworks and theoretical underpinnings, when observing the same group, may well provide different interpretations using sound interpretive research.

To try to consider which research is ‘stronger’ we are tied by HERMENEUTICS – truth is constructed by the rhetoric of the researchers. “A good explanation makes sense of the behaviour, but to appreciate the good explanation, one must agree on what makes good sense. What makes good sense is a function of ones readings, and these in turn are based on the kind of sense one understands.” ”Truth is what we agree to be true at any one time”.

However, different interpretations can co-exist, providing a richer view of a culture.

The Critical Paradigm

There is no such thing as ‘critical theory’; it’s an umbrella term for a range of different theories. The key commonly shared assumption is EMANCIPATION – enabling people to gain knowledge and power in order to take control of their lives. There is a dismissal of positivism as a means of enforcing the status quo whilst producing theories that are “often trivial and useless”.

Critical theory developed from the work of the Frankfurt School; it is overtly political, highlighting substantive social issues, uncovering the oppression within these issues and, importantly, doing something about it.

With regard to ontology and epistemology, there are two strands running through the critical paradigm:

1. Associated with positivism – a RADICAL STRUCTURALIST strand with an external realist ontology, an objectivist epistemology and a deterministic view of people. It concentrates on STRUCTURAL relationships within a realist social world via analysis of deepseated internal contradictions and the analysis of power relationships.
2. Associated with radical humanism – similar to the interpretive paradigm, it has in internal-idealist ontology, a subjectivist epistemology and a voluntaristic view of people. It is believed that reality is socially constructed, knowledge is context specific and value-laden.

Critical theorists see interpretive paradigm research as having major weaknesses as they do not consider the wider sociohistorical, political and economic movements on the theories.

One major concern within education research (PE) is that interpretivist research has not taken into account the way individual and group behaviour is influenced by the way society is organised. Findings are determined within a social and organisational context permeated by the inequal power relationships (cf Foucault?) Anderson (1989a) suggests these following critical research questions regarding the nature of knowledge in organisations:

1. What counts as knowledge?
2. How is what counts as knowledge organised?
3. How is what counts as knowledge transmitted?
4. How is access to what counts as knowledge determined?
5. What are the processes of control?
6. What ideological appeals justify the system?

The central emphasis is the way human consciousness is shaped and controlled by existing social arrangements to serve some groups in society at the expense of others (INEQUAL POWER RELATIONSHIPS). Relational analysis is often used to analyse these relationships – viewing the historical, social and cultural constructs surrounding the practice under study.

Griffin (1990): “

1. Society is made of groups with power and privilege and those without;
2. Social institutions in a society perpetuate the status quo of this power imbalance;
3. The powerful and privileged have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo (their power and privilege);
4. The powerless and disadvantaged have a vested interest in social change;
5. The competing interests result in conflict and tension, often below the surface of apparent harmony and consensus;
6. The critical perspective brings to light the contradictions between apparent harmony/consensus and conflict/tension, in order to problematize the status quo;
7. A critical perspective is concerned with ‘why/why not’ questions – whose interest is served? The intention is to change the world, not describe it;
8. A critical perspective believes in the importance of changing individual and group consciousness in creating social change.

Critical researchers may use data collection techniques from the interpretive paradigm, but go further, to investigate the inequal power relationships – critical ethnography. This can be done in three ways:

1. Consider the subject group in a wider social context. This is weak as the critical analysis can be omitted if it just analyses functional relationships between the subject group and the wider social milieu.
2. Critical ethnography through focussing on the wider structural relations and examining how social processes in the subject group are mediated by structural relations.
3. The strongest form is to incorporate ethnography into a DIALECTICAL analysis – the understandings from the ethnographic study are analysed in relation to the social structures that shape the lives of people.

This final method begins with structural relationships and then undertakes an ethnographic study in order to facilitate a structural analysis.

Where critical ethnographers differ is that they claim that the subject’s perceptions of social reality are permeated with meanings that sustain powerlessness. The conscious models used by people exist to ensure the continuance of the social phenomena.

Researchers investigate the process by which certain meaning structures become accepted as the status quo. They then consider whose interest the status quo benefits. They actively engage with the social group to elicit transformation through understanding and action. They seek to change the world. Examples of the critical paradigm are: feminist research and neo-Marxist critical ethnography.

For transformation to occur, research must be done with the full participation of the people under study. The researcher provides those researched with insights that might act as the basis for change. The researched are participants in the process not subjects to be studied.

Validity has a very different definition in critical research. It needs to be understood as being relevant to the practitioner’s situation, and potentially transformative, to be valid. “Validity in critical research relates not only to the trustworthiness and credibility of the interpretation but also how effective the research process has been in empowering the participants and enabling them to create change.” This is very different to the positivist view of researcher neutrality. Therefore, validity’s definition changes significantly depending on the paradigm within which you work.

Comment by Sparkes

Validity derives its meaning from different sets of assumptions, theories and purposes within the different paradigms. Each paradigm needs to be understood in its own terms. It is important to recognise that each paradigm can help develop our understanding of the social world, and also that new paradigms will be developed. You must judge research carried out within a paradigm according to that paradigm’s own criteria and assumptions. It is important to be aware of the assumptions within each paradigm, even if you do not work within it.

What does all this mean to me?

Not a lot at the moment…

Firstly, this paper was written a long time ago, now. I’m sure the arguments have moved on and that there are new paradigms that have taken over as the most in touch with the ‘zeitgeist’.
Secondly – the long words… my brain hurts…
Thirdly, whilst I get the gist of critical research, I doubt I could get involved in it. The thought of being transformative in the research seems such a huge jump, especially with my background in empiricism and the ‘detached scientist’ viewpoint. Interpretivism doesn’t seem quite such a huge leap, though. We’ll see. Lots more to read, and I need to go back to look at some of the terms I don’t understand.